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Abstract 
 
The micro-brewing, or craft brewing industry, is a rapidly emerging section of 
Ontario’s economy and local food system (Agriculture & Agri-Food Canada, 2015; Beer 
Canada, 2016). Since the late 1980s, over 300 breweries have opened shop in Ontario. The 
growth of the industry is interesting for a number of reasons. The government control of 
beer and alcohol sales in the province has created a number of challenges for small scale 
brewers, challenges only now beginning to shift. Historically, the beer industry has been 
defined by the consolidation of three major industrial scale brewers who control at least 
80% of the market. The growing craft sector has pulled local agriculture toward 
commercial hop production, and opened up discussion of grain sourcing and processing. 
The trend toward local consumption has created a broader dialogue that questions the 
dominant corporate and government controlled framework of beer and alcohol sales in 
Ontario. The industry’s recent growth also appears to, in part, be related to the broader 
local food movement. 
This paper offers an interdisciplinary discussion on the emerging industry.  It relies 
on three major lenses to offer a current assessment of the industry and the experience a 
brewing entrepreneur has in Ontario at present. First, it looks at the craft brewing industry 
within the framework of the local food network in Ontario. Second, this paper places the 
small to medium enterprise (SME) network of the micro-brewing industry within the 
framework of the Green Economy, which sees SMEs as having a pivotal role. It also seeks to 
understand the role of SMEs in contributing to a low-growth, or steady-state economy as 
outlined by Victor, 2008. Finally, this paper approaches the industry at the individual 
company level, examining business practices and sustainability therein.  The approach 
taken by this paper is useful in understanding the functional and operational challenges 
and successes food SMEs have in carrying out their place within the green economy and 
local food system.  
This paper contributes a new perspective to the limited existing literature on the 
craft beer industry in Ontario, and by extension the emerging role of SMEs in the growing 
local food sector. By undertaking analysis of four distinct breweries of various life-spans 
and scale, it assumes some common challenges or successes the brewing entrepreneur 
would find in this sector. The major questions addressed in this paper are: what role do 
SMEs have to play in the local food movement in Ontario; what are their entrepreneurial 
limitations or strengths under the current system, and by extension, what are their 
capabilities in integrating sustainability into their business practices? 
Lastly, the findings highlight patterns and trends, and offer some recommendations 
regarding the future of craft in the Province and some speculations on leveling the playing 
field of the retail sales channels systems. Results show that craft brewing entrepreneurs 
are committed to maintaining independence and autonomy over their businesses, are 
driven by passion for the craft and are mindful of growing their businesses responsibly. 
Many of these entrepreneurs are highly conscientious and critical of growing too large, and 
aim to integrate ethics and sustainability into their business practices in response to the 
glaring issues corporate consolidation has created for themselves and the economy. 
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Foreword 
 
 This Major Paper is the final document to satisfy the requirements of my Plan of 
Study in the Master in Environmental Studies program, Business and Environment stream 
in the York University Faculty of Environmental Studies. The paper is an interdisciplinary 
assessment of the craft beer industry in Ontario, which utilizes four case studies of Ontario 
craft breweries. It draws on the three components of my Plan of Study: 1) Sustainable 
Business Practice; 2) The Green Economy & Low Growth Economics, and; 3) Sustainable 
Local Food Systems. 
 Component #1, ‘Sustainable Business Practice’, was satisfied by my engagement 
with beer industry entrepreneurs, a number of whom bring sustainability to their business 
strategies. For those that did not as a core strategy, I was able to assess what factors 
contributed to integrating environmental concerns into business operations. I particularly 
addressed both learning objectives 1.1) Basic business strategy and thinking and 1.3) 
‘Understand how businesses can work toward both mission driven and profit driven gains 
without compromise.  
 Component #2, ‘The Green Economy & Low Growth Economics’ is concerned with 
the alternative economic frameworks which seek to see the economy function within 
resource constraints, and a macro economic framework that promotes prosperity and 
wellbeing over uncapped GDP growth as the end goal. I was able to address this component 
with this major paper extensively; craft brewing SMEs are often critical of growing too 
large as they have experienced friction and limitations as new market entrants in an 
industry that was built on business-as-usual economic values, i.e., one that has historically 
privileged industrial economies of scale, heavy foreign investment and commodification of 
its core product. They seek to benefit their local economies and often see firm growth as 
secondary to business ethics and integrity. I particularly satisfied learning strategy 2.3) 
‘Explore the possibilities in small scale local business.’  
 Component #3, ‘Sustainable Local Food Systems’ was addressed through an 
assessment the craft beer industry as a cluster of firms functioning within the local food 
system. The growth of the craft beer industry in Ontario has stimulated growth in the 
agricultural hop growing industry, as well as dialogue surrounding grain procurement in 
Canada. Strategy 3.1) ‘Gain an understanding of business and economic frameworks for 
understanding the food system’ was satisfied through discussing the challenges in 
ingredient sourcing, and provided context for the entrepreneurial challenges facing food 
system SMEs.  
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1.0 Introduction 
The micro-brewing, or craft brewing industry, is a rapidly emerging section of Ontario’s 
economy and local food system (Agriculture & Agri-Food Canada, 2015; Beer Canada, 
2016). Since the late 1980s, 311 breweries have opened shop in Ontario. The growth of the 
industry is interesting for a number of reasons. The government control of beer and alcohol 
sales in the province has created a number of challenges for small scale brewers, challenges 
only now beginning to shift. Historically, the beer industry has been defined by the 
consolidation of three major industrial scale brewers who control at least 80% of the 
market. The growing craft sector has pulled local agriculture toward commercial hop 
production and opened up discussion of grain sourcing and processing. The trend toward 
local consumption has created a broader dialogue that questions the dominant corporate 
and government controlled framework of beer and alcohol sales in Ontario. The industry’s 
recent growth also appears to, in part, be related to the broader local food movement, with 
a developing terroir of Ontario beer.  
This paper offers an interdisciplinary discussion on the emerging industry. I relied 
on three major lenses to offer a current assessment of the industry and the experience a 
brewing entrepreneur has in Ontario at present. First, I understand the craft brewing 
industry within the framework of the local food network in Ontario. It is a network of small 
to medium enterprises (SMEs) that have formed a cluster. I agree with Feenstra’s (1997) 
definition of a local food economy as a self-sustaining network of closely knit food 
producers and consumers, stimulating local economic activity. The recent surge in activity 
in the craft beer industry echoes this concept.  A local palate for craft beer is developing, as 
well as an affinity for the community food system that created it. As beer is an alcoholic 
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beverage, it is not an essential food item, though it reflects many of the same principles as 
those applied by local food processors.  
Second, this paper places the SME network of the micro-brewing industry within the 
framework of the green economy (Victor, P; Jackson, T, 2013), which sees SMEs having a 
pivotal role. “These organizations typically have strong ties to their local environment and 
community. SME’s are well placed to disseminate knowledge and innovative practices 
whilst delivering environmental and economic resilience,” (Green Economy Coalition, 
2012; Eurobarometer, 2012). Further, it seeks to understand the role of SMEs such as these 
in contributing to a low-growth or steady-state economy as outlined by Victor (2008). A 
major principle of this macroeconomic model is to question the value of growth as the sole 
or primary economic motivator. A key component of the micro-brewing movement has 
been motivating factors for entrepreneurs aside from company growth, such as passion 
(Watne; Hakala, 2013), but also a desire to remain small-scaled, independently owned, and 
highly critical of uncapped firm growth.   
Finally, this paper approaches the industry at the individual company level, 
examining business practices and sustainability therein.  This approach is useful in 
understanding the functional and operational challenges and successes food SMEs have in 
carrying out their place within the green economy and local food system.  I endeavoured to 
understand the challenges and successes regarding financing, operations, distribution and 
marketing of these SMEs within the odd existing political framework in the province. 
In understanding the business challenges and successes of micro-breweries, it is 
crucial to understand the policies that dictate what these businesses can and cannot do, 
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and what challenges have flowed from functioning in the shadow of mega foreign-owned 
breweries. In some cases, that corporate concentration has been entrenched in brewing 
policies in Ontario. Thus, this paper will provide discussion on the major regulations 
affecting craft brewers, what effect those regulations have on day-to-day business 
practices, and the nature of the business relationships those regulations create. It must be 
noted that as recently as December 2015, a number of major policy roadblocks have been 
addressed by the Government of Ontario and so the subject is ripe for future discussion on 
the impact those new policies will have.  
The major questions addressed in this paper are: what role do SMEs have to play 
in the local food movement in Ontario; what are their entrepreneurial limitations or 
strengths under the current system and, by extension, what are their capabilities in 
integrating sustainability into their business practices? 
 
1.1 The History of Ontario’s Beer Industry 
  Ontario’s beer industry has a long and complicated history. As beer is an alcoholic 
beverage, brewing companies have been subject to criticism from the temperance 
movement, are vulnerable to prohibition laws and function at the mercy of liquor control 
laws. In the early-to-mid-20th century, the industrial revolution, pushes for efficiency, 
globalization and the consolidation of manufacturing affected the beer industry, and by 
extension the final product as we know it today.  At present, segments of the beer industry 
are changing dramatically and regulatory frameworks are similarly being altered to catch 
up. 
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Early breweries in Ontario were small operations that almost exclusively 
distributed locally. In the early-to-mid-19th century, the local brewery located in a small 
Ontario town was common. Transportation channels for distribution were limited and the 
majority of production remained artisanal, with most beer styles borrowed from Ireland, 
England and Scotland, where the majority of the population had recently emigrated from. 
Near the end of the 19th century, major Ontario-based companies (that continue to exist 
today) such as Labatt, Carling, O’Keefe and Sleeman took control of the market and grew to 
industrial scale, in step with other manufacturing industries during the industrial 
revolution. The growth of the industry was slowed immensely by the prohibition era, 
which came into effect in 1916. It is worth noting that during prohibition, the manufacture 
of beer was never outlawed outright, in that manufacturers were able to continue to brew 
for export. This meant that breweries that had certain economies of scale were able to 
remain afloat. This is primarily how the existing beer companies from the pre-prohibition 
era were able to persist throughout this period.  
In 1927, prohibition was lifted and the Liquor Control Board of Ontario (LCBO) was 
created, along with the beer distributor Brewers Warehousing Company Ltd., which was a 
collective effort of the few existing major brewing companies to warehouse and wholesale 
distribute beer.  With the purchase of all brewing retail outlets in 1940 by the newly 
formed Brewers Retail Inc., the only alcohol sales in Ontario not directly administered by 
the Province were controlled by the major brewers.  
 Throughout the mid-20th century, the beer industry underwent further 
consolidation whereby the already large breweries got larger. The industry could be 
characterized as an oligopoly, that is, in the hands of a small number of very large firms 
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producing a uniform product. “It was separated by differentiated advertising strategies, 
much like many other industries that capitalized on scientific management and the “Ford 
assembly line” strategy focused on efficiency, standardization, and economies of scale.  In 
short, beer brewing is a highly institutionalized field” (Catalfamo; Menna, 2012, pg. 3).  
Refrigeration made it possible to store and ship beer products over great distances, 
eliminating the major barriers to centralized mass production (Clemons, Gao, & Hitt, 2006; 
Tremblay et al, 2005).  Many studies on the beer industry in Ontario and Canada have 
touched on the industrious history of E.P. Taylor and the biggest breweries throughout the 
20th century: Molson, Labatt’s, Carling and O’Keefe.  These breweries existed as large 
staples from the end of the 19th and well into the 20th century, with two of the three 
continuing today. Brewing at a large scale has meant that many business and economic 
studies of the brewing industry have focused on the benefits of efficient, large scale 
industrial breweries (Swinnen, 2011; Rohmer, Wilson & Ghourvish, 1998). During this key 
period, the concept of establishing the lowest price for beer possible was established to 
decrease “wasteful selling expenses” while increasing sales, volume and taxes for the war 
effort (McLeod, 2014). These priorities and the aim for this particular definition of 
economic efficiency resonated in the brewing industry throughout the century.  
Styles of beer were affected by the commodification of the beverage. The lager, a 
particular style of beer that is yellow in colour, fizzy and mild in taste reigned supreme. The 
style became the standard for industrial brewing, as brewing one style of beer was most 
efficient for mass production. Further, beer manufacturers could use up to 140 ingredients 
in the beverage; this meant that adjuncts such as corn or rice could replace more expensive 
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grains, with tastes so mild that the nuances ceased to matter. By extension, the common 
beer drinker became accustomed to the basic, often bland-tasting lager as the new normal.  
Throughout the ‘50s, ‘60s and ‘70s, major industrial beer manufacturers utilized 
ubiquitous advertising campaigns to differentiate their product and appeal to the 
consumer’s identity. The mass production and mass advertised nature of the beer industry, 
along with a lack of literacy regarding different beer styles meant that for new brewers to 
enter the market with a different product, their chances of survival were slim. Today, the 
two leading breweries control approximately 85% of Canadian-made beer sold 
domestically (Labatt Brewing, owned by Anheuser-Bush InBev SS, Molson Coors Brewing 
Co.).  The third largest brewery controls roughly 6% of the market (Sleeman Breweries 
Limited, owned by Japan’s Sapporo Breweries) while the balance (9%) of domestically-
produced beer is supplied by the micro-breweries (Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada, 
2010). 
“In the late 1970s and early 1980s, North America industry was embattled as 
stagflation and increased competition, especially from Japan and Germany, squeezed 
profitability.  Product quality had declined, costs were high, and sensitivity to customer 
requirements was absent.  This resulted in declining market power of established 
manufacturers in almost every sector, and the advent of greater competition globally 
marked the beginning of new business models that would later evolve into new industries 
and would contribute to standard of living. As such, it was a perfect time for a new industry 
to emerge, or, in the case of Ontario’s micro-breweries to reemerge several decades later.  
In Ontario, for the micro-brewery industry to reemerge and expand, it had to redefine itself 
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by breaking “out of the box” and create new relationships with customers in the rapidly 
changing marketplace” (Menna; Catalfamo, 2012, pg. 4). 
Organic growth for a young microbrewery seemed unlikely prior to the 1980s, but 
began to enter the realm of entrepreneurial possibility during the 1990s and into the 
2000s. Entrepreneurial pioneers began to snowball during these decades. Gradually, as 
microbreweries experienced success and showed business acumen and economic stability, 
craft beer began to succeed. As a result, the literature on the craft beer (or microbrewery) 
movement in Ontario is still in its infancy. Many studies on the microbrewing industry have 
looked at the United States, New Zealand or Australia, but Ontario’s craft beer movement 
faces a unique set of challenges unlike any other region.  
The Ontario Craft Brewers Association formed in the early 2000s and has lobbied 
provincial and federal governments for changes to unfair policies that favoured the large 
foreign-owned brewers.  In 2006, the Federal government implemented a tiered taxation 
system for excise taxes on brewers, and the Ontario government followed suit with the 
Beer and Wine tax in 2010. In 2004, the Ontario government introduced the Ontario 
Microbrewery Strategy and has provided funding to small brewing entrepreneurs in 
various forms ever since. In the 2015 Budget, the Ontario Government introduced the New 
Beer Framework which addressed a number of structural issues in retail sales and 
distribution policies. 
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Currently, there are roughly 300 licensed micro- breweries1 operating in Ontario, 
including contract brewers who received manufacturing licenses from the Alcohol and 
Gaming Commission of Ontario (AGCO).  
 
1.2 Terminology: Micro-brewing and Craft Beer 
The terminology ‘craft brewing’ or ‘micro-brewing’ is admittedly fluid. The 
distinction occurs most in craft beer regions that have similar histories of corporate 
consolidation and the commodity-lager. “Currently, devotees distinguish between “craft” 
and “mass” beers. ‘Craft’ connotes both ‘small scale’ and ‘high quality’, with ‘quality’ usually 
meaning no ‘adjuncts’ (like rice or corn) and no artificial ingredients; but scale and quality 
are not synonymous… two American beers of craft quality, are produced under contract in 
large breweries; and every domestic lager in Germany, however large the brewery that 
produced it, is free of adjuncts and artificial ingredients.” (Swinnen, 2011, p.230) 
Conversely, in the 1990’s, the term “premium” was commonly used in beer 
marketing to distinguish supposed high quality beers from those of lesser quality. The term 
became so commonly used that it ceases to have any concrete meaning (ibid., pg. 191). 
                                                          
1 41 brewpubs, 52 contract brewers  
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 The Liquor Control Act broadly defines the term “small brewer.” That definition is as 
follows:  
This paper will use “micro-brewing” and “craft beer” synonymously. The term “craft” will 
be understood as a catch-all for the three tenets of craft as described by the Ontario Craft 
Brewer’s Association (OCB). These tenets are:  
 
It is worth nothing that each brewery interviewed for this paper holds membership with 
the Ontario Craft Brewers Association, and as such each brewer discussed in this paper 
abides by these standards. 
(4) For the purposes of paragraph 10 of subsection (2), a beer manufacturer is a small 
brewer for a sales year if, 
(a) in the preceding production year, the manufacturer’s worldwide 
production did not exceed 400,000 hectolitres of beer or, if the manufacturer has 
been manufacturing beer for less than one year, its worldwide production is not 
expected to exceed 400,000 hectolitres of beer in the year; and 
(b) every affiliate that the manufacturer had that manufactured beer in the 
preceding production year was a small brewer (Liquor Control Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. 
L.18). 
 
“SMALL Most Ontario Craft Brewers are small and many are family-owned. The 
current maximum size of an Ontario Craft Brewer is 400,000 hectolitres of annual 
worldwide beer production. 
INDEPENDENT Locally-owned and is not significantly controlled by a beer company 
who does not qualify as an Ontario Craft Brewer. 
TRADITIONAL Pledge to brew traditional and innovative beers according to the 
Ontario Craft Brewers' Brewing Philosophy. The original Philosophy was signed on 
April 12, 2006 and was updated in September 2013” (Ontario Craft Brewers, 2015). 
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This paper will also use the catch-all “foreign-owned brewers” and “macro brewers” 
to refer to Molson-Coors, Labatt (AB-Inbev) and Sleemen. I use this term as it easily 
distinguishes the independent brewers in this paper from these competitors.  
 
1.3 The Economics of Craft Beer: in the Literature 
Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada’s description of the Canadian beer industry is as 
follows:  
“The Canadian industry has rationalized considerably through mergers, 
acquisitions and new microbrewery start-ups, and continues to do so. Over 
the years, the industry structure has changed as the number of conventional 
plants has decreased while the number of micro-breweries has increased 
considerably. As of 2009, both conventional and micro-brewery plants 
operate in all ten provinces, and one is located in the Yukon.” (Agriculture 
and Agri-Food Canada).  
 
The growth of the craft beer industry is not unique to Ontario: there are similar 
regions whose growth of craft brewing parallels Ontario’s recent growth. In the existing 
and emergent literature on craft beer industries, the concepts of Resource Partitioning 
Theory and the Long Tail theory are often used to analyze the growth of niche industry. 
The industry’s growth in various parts of the world is interesting because many economists 
such as Porter (1980) did not foresee it, “in fact, they predicted the opposite—a continued 
contraction in firms… [Porter] wrote that “in the brewing industry, product differentiation 
is coupled with economies of scale in production, marketing and distribution to create high 
barriers” (Carroll; Swaminathan, 2000).  
Resource partitioning theory essentially acknowledges craft brewers as specialists 
within their field, emerging from a need for specialization in a commodified market. 
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“Resource-partitioning theory explains the rise of late-stage specialist segments within an 
industry as an (unexpected) outcome of the consolidation occurring among large generalist 
organizations as they compete for the largest consumer resource bases of the mass market” 
(ibid.).  
In this case, large breweries such as Molson-Coors, Labatt or Sleeman can be 
understood as “generalist organizations,” in that they are meeting a general need for beer 
in the market, while microbreweries can be understood as “specialist organizations,” that 
choose narrow, homogenous targets. Craft brewers, then, are competing with the large, 
foreign-owned brewers indirectly by offering a differentiated product. 
Similarly, the Long Tail theory (Anderson, 2009) can help explain the business 
strategy of successful niche products. Essentially the theory sees increased choice leading 
consumers to seek out specialized products, as opposed to the one variety of a mass-
produced product. The consumer’s ability to seek out and demand more unique, 
differentiated products has been benefitted by new media channels such as the internet, 
which have made it profitable for companies to create products that market to these 
niches. The theory is described as “large quantity of unique items, small quantities sold of 
each” versus “fewer, popular items in large quantities” (ibid).  
18 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: <www.longtail.com> 
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2.0 Current Frameworks 
2.1 Regulation  
Both the federal and provincial governments regulate and tax the production and 
sale of beer. The Government of Canada regulates the production, quality, labelling, 
advertising and international trade of beer and imposes commodity, consumption and 
excise taxes. The Government of Ontario regulates the production, distribution, pricing and 
marketing and imposes licence fees and commodity taxes on the production and sale of 
beer. 
In Ontario, social policy objectives have had a significant effect on the direction of 
policies adopted by alcoholic beverage regulators, with the Government of Ontario having a 
high degree of involvement, particularly in the regulation of pricing, sale and distribution. 
The primary distribution channels for breweries in Ontario are the LCBO, The Beer Store 
(TBS), brewery-owned on-site retail stores, bars and restaurants and, as of November 
2015, licensed grocery stores. Provincial and federal taxes, fees and levies account for 
approximately 50% of the retail price of beer. The Alcohol and Gaming Commission of 
Ontario (“AGCO”) also enforces a Minimum Retail Price (MRP) for beer and requires each 
product to be sold at a uniform price across all retail outlets.   
The sale of beer in Ontario is regulated through the Liquor License Act and the 
Liquor Control Act. The Liquor License Act enforces certain licensing requirements for 
breweries and requires breweries to pay fees to the Government of Ontario based on the 
volume of beer shipped for sale and distribution. The Liquor Control Act establishes the 
LCBO as the regulator for the sale of liquor in Ontario.  With the introduction of the 
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harmonized sales tax (“HST”) in Ontario, the total sales tax on beer dropped from 17% to 
4%, and a Beer and Wine tax administered by the Ministry of Revenue was introduced to 
make up for the lost revenue.  
 
2.2 Sales Channels 
For the purposes of this paper it is important to understand the sales channels 
available to small brewers. Alcohol sales in Ontario are highly regulated, and as such, 
complicated for the entrepreneur navigating those regulations. Sales are arguably the most 
regulated component of a craft brewer’s business operations. Craft brewers have five major 
sales channels available to them, and each has its own particular nuances prescribed in 
legislation that often affect what sales relationships look like to the brewer. The sales 
channels a small brewer opts to build their business on can reveal much about the nature 
of Ontario’s liquor control policies and how difficult or easy those regulations are to follow. 
Sales channels for small brewers in Ontario have also been a point of political controversy 
for a number of reasons. Ontario’s alcohol retail sales have historically been controlled by 
the LCBO, a Crown monopoly, and The Beer Store (TBS), which is owned by the three 
largest foreign-owned beer manufacturers in Canada and holds a monopoly on selling beer 
in large formats such as twelve and twenty-four packs. TBS, or Brewers Retail Inc., has had 
an ongoing relationship with the LCBO since the end of prohibition in the 1920s (Genosko, 
2012), with this preferential treatment continuing in the form of written agreements as 
recently as 2000 (BRI; LCBO, 2000). The small brewers interviewed for this paper, 
unsurprisingly, noted complicated relationships with both firms, as will be discussed in the 
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analysis section of this paper. Aside from these two major retail channels, manufacturers 
are permitted to sell product where it was manufactured and their prices must match by 
law what those products are listed for in the LCBO. Brewers also have the option of selling 
their beer directly through licensees – that is, at bars or restaurants that are licenced to 
serve alcohol.  
On December 15, 2015, the Provincial Government permitted beer sales in “New 
Private Retail Outlets,” i.e. grocery stores. At the time of the majority of interviews for this 
paper, grocery store sales had not yet been launched. For the few interviews that occurred 
after the announcement and subsequent launch, there was some rich commentary on what 
that sales relationship may look like in the future. 
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3.0 Methods 
I utilized case study analysis (Yin, 1984) on four brewery cases. I interviewed four brewery 
owners and in some cases a number of their staff utilizing semi-structured interview 
questions. In these interviews I gleaned their start-up stories, what challenges and points 
of ease existed during that process, what present challenges and successes they report and 
their perceptions of the industry at large. The interview guide can be found in the appendix.  
In choosing breweries to interview for this paper, I attempted to represent differing 
scales of operations and lifespans. In including two older breweries that had existed since 
the mid-to-late-1990s, I was able to capture some of the progression of the craft brewing 
movement up to now. Examining four breweries of different scales – which is commonly 
understood by yearly hectolitre output -  I was able to glean information on the scaling 
process for a craft brewer, as well as how certain policy frameworks affect smaller and 
larger SMEs. Including one start-up brewer, Block Three2, I was able to gather information 
on what market entry for a brewing entrepreneur looks like at present.  
To supplement information and provide added nuance, I included one interview 
from an industry worker, Erica Campbell, who has worked in sales at three separate 
Ontario craft breweries. Her insights on her relationship with The Beer Store, the LCBO, 
licensees and her perspective on her strategies to navigate grocery store sales were 
invaluable to gaining insight on the nature of SMEs’ relationships to large companies.  
                                                          
2 It is worth noting that I had hoped to include one more start-up brewer, though it was difficult to find research 
subjects at this scale and age of business that were willing to participate. I speculate that this is due to the hectic 
nature of running a start-up business.  
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This paper utilizes an interdisciplinary approach to understand Ontario’s 
burgeoning craft beer industry. Many of these entrepreneurs approach their business 
practices with a sense of ethics to counter the market concentration and disconnectedness 
and corporate bullying of the foreign-owned breweries, and as such there is room for 
discussion of the interworkings of sustainability and local economic prosperity.  How SMEs 
work things like sustainability and social consciousness into their business models will be 
explored and discussed.  
Similarly, the craft beer industry in Ontario represents a growing local agri-food 
industry network, so bringing principles of food studies into this paper was pertinent. The 
growth of the industry has created a demand for many resources, among them hops and 
grains, for which Ontario agricultural production lags. Understanding this industry as part 
of a larger network of suppliers, processors, producers and consumers reveals much about 
the cultivation of a thriving local economy.  
Many craft brewers hold the view that uncapped growth is neither the means nor 
the ends of success. This sentiment is in keeping with the low growth economic principles 
of Victor (2008). Perhaps as a result of attempting to eke out success in the shadow of the 
foreign-owned brewers that control 80% of the Canadian market, these entrepreneurs 
have a heightened awareness of the flaws inherent in growing their businesses too big and 
are seeing the local economic benefits that vibrant small businesses can contribute to.  
No discussion of an alcohol in Ontario can exist without addressing the tricky, 
convoluted and challenging political and legislative landscape craft brewing entrepreneurs 
must function within. To look at industry success factors and to understand the growth of 
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the network, this paper must necessarily explore briefly the policies that most affect craft 
brewing entrepreneurs.  
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4.0 CASE STUDY: Beau’s All Natural Brewing Co.  
 
 
Source: Beaus.ca 
Beau’s All Natural Brewing Co. has been in existence since July 2006. It is located in 
Vankleek Hill, Ontario, a small town an hour east of Ottawa and an hour west of the Quebec 
border. It currently operates at 40,000 hectolitres per year and employs 140, 91.6% full 
time and 8.4% part-time. Endearingly referred to as Beau’s, this company brands itself as 
an All Natural company as it adheres to Pro-Cert Organic Systems Ltd. standards, using 
only certified organic ingredients. They market their product as a niche high-end premium, 
building on local palate. Beau’s distributes all over the Province of Ontario, and has broken 
into the Quebec and Upstate New York markets.  
 
4.1 The Story 
Beau’s company narrative is an endearing one, founded as a father and son family 
company in the town that President Steve Beauchesne grew up in. In 2004, Steve was living 
in Toronto doing business planning for the government during the day and running a 
record label at night called Go Go Go Records. His father was running a textile business in 
the building where Beau’s is currently housed until the textile business moved offshore. Mr. 
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Beauchesne Sr. went to visit Steve in Toronto, bereft of his profitable business. Steve was 
an avid homebrewer and had been following the slow build of the craft beer movement. As 
many craft breweries’ start up stories begin, the two had the idea over a couple of beers, 
and over the following two years took steps to set their business plan in motion. At the 
time, Eastern Ontario did not have a notable craft brewery, so the father and son 
entrepreneurs endeavoured to fill the void.  
 
4.2 Challenges: “Anything that is easy wouldn’t be fun.” 
In the beginning stages, securing a business loan from traditional banks was a 
challenge as a craft brewery seemed high-risk and there was little, if any, evidence of 
successful craft breweries. Business Development Canada, Canada’s most progressive 
lender, did not believe a craft brewery could be successful at the time. The bank insisted on 
a feasibility study, that would convince a consultant that their brewery had a high chance of 
succeeding. Despite convincing plenty of characters within the banking system that they 
had a feasible business model, they ran into a number of roadblocks before they could 
secure funding from their local bank, though in the end their start up loan was significantly 
smaller than they had expected.  Beau’s experience in the early 2000s reveals the hesitancy 
of financial institutions to support start-up businesses such as craft breweries.  
Steve believes that receiving an initial loan of less than half of what they had 
expected was, in fact, helpful in that it “built a sense of frugality into the business model”. 
They were forced to be resourceful and do more with less. It instilled a sense of urgency 
and importance in making the business profitable. 
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Their biggest challenge: keeping up with the growth rate and growing responsibly. 
The growth rate at Beau’s has never been less than 35% per year (with last year’s growth 
at 47%), and as such there are big decisions to make at the end of each fiscal year. This 
level of organic growth has meant that there is a built-in process of examining where to 
reinvest in the company and identify what needs arise as the company grows. Candidly, 
this is an ideal problem for a new business to have.  
Steve pointed out very quickly that with regards to sales channels in Ontario, “there 
are challenges that cannot be understated,” but he pressed that the company’s biggest 
challenge had always been keeping up with growth from a financing perspective.   
 
4.3 Success Factors 
Beau’s was able to take advantage of a wide open market landscape. Prior to Beau’s, 
the Ottawa area had had a number of notable craft brewery failures. Hart Brewery, which 
had existed from 1991 to 2001, had shut its doors for a number of reasons. Steve 
speculated that this may have been because “it was before its time.” It was noted that prior 
to the mid-2000s, Ottawa was considered a dead zone for craft beer, with many Toronto-
based breweries uninterested in exploring the market in that region due to expected low 
sales. Beau’s was in a position to be most people’s first craft beer experience in the area. 
This pioneering of the market has generated a brand loyalty and recognisability that has 
worked to the company’s advantage. 
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4.4 Marketing Strategy 
The frugality of Beau’s early business operations allowed for an unexpected 
advantage. The company does not engage in traditional advertising, as it presented too high 
an expense during the company’s modest beginnings. Beau’s has utilized a strictly in-house 
marketing team. The cost savings from not paying for advertising, by their account, allowed 
the Beauchesnes to allocate more resources toward quality ingredients and producing the 
highest quality product with the acknowledgement that “if your beer isn’t good, it doesn’t 
matter what you spend on advertising.” (Interview, Steve Beauchesne, Nov. 11, 2015). 
The advantage presented itself when their product gained popularity through word 
of mouth and direct relationships. “[Not having advertising] meant that you heard our 
name through the friend that you trusted or sommelier at the restaurant who would talk 
you into trying this great beer from Vankleek Hill.” (ibid.) This cultivated a trust in the 
product and added to a general culture of authenticity: the relationship with the product 
would come before the brand recognition.  
Beau’s also recognizes that the local food movement has aided the company’s 
success. Beau’s sales in its first few years were focused on licensee keg sales in Ottawa. The 
emerging prominence of independent, chef-led restaurants and bars since the mid 2000s 
meant that Beau’s earliest sales representatives were able to form direct relationships with 
a substantial number of bar and restaurant owners to build momentum around the product 
and company locally.  
A successful marketing tactic was to partner with restaurants who were early 
adopters of the local food movement and craft beer. While the macro breweries continue to 
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hold the majority of market share and their product continues to monopolize tap space at 
large chain restaurants and bars, Beau’s found that there were an increasing number of 
locally-focused bars that were eager to serve craft and partner with them over the macro 
breweries. This marketing channel was also practical for the company as taking on lower 
volume accounts meant that the company could keep up with the demand it was creating in 
its early stages. 
As the first mover in the Ottawa area, Beauchesne had witnessed the gradual 
acceptance of the craft market first hand: once the independent licensee accounts began to 
gain traction and there was a demand for local beer, larger accounts began to take note in a 
second wave of adopters of the product.  
 
4.5 Organic Certification & Ethical Sourcing 
Beau’s is certified under Pro-Cert Organic Systems Ltd. Steve Beauchesne explained 
that when the company opened they were unsure of whether organic certification was 
worth the financial investment as it would peg operating costs at 40% higher than any 
other brewery. Branding themselves as “All Natural,” the company chose to certify with 
Pro-Cert after hearing skepticism from consumers that they were in fact organic and using 
natural ingredients, and that without the proper certification, the “All Natural” component 
of the company’s branding was greenwashing. It seems as though organic certification has 
had a positive impact on the growth and success of Beau’s.  
 
30 
 
4.6 Sustainability  
Sustainability was a continuous discussion throughout this case study. To his 
approach to sustainable business practice, Steve expressed “I feel like I keep trying to do 
the right thing the right way … and make mindful decisions. Growth seems to be what we 
are rewarded with for doing the right thing … it [sustainability in business] is about making 
mindful decisions” (ibid.). 
Beau’s organic certification has caused the company to place special emphasis on 
ensuring quality from its suppliers. The company employs at least two staff to oversee 
Organic Compliance and ensure that orders of grain and ingredients received are up to the 
company’s rigorous standards as well as ensuring all documentation is up to date for 
regular audits from Pro Cert.  These staff noted in interviews that stringent documentation 
and auditing is not particularly difficult to maintain, and has only benefitted the brewery 
and its processes.   
The company has a sense of itself as a major local economic driver, with a 
responsibility to act as leader in its community. This is evident in its purchasing practices. 
The company’s organic supply requirements have meant that they must necessarily acquire 
ingredients from Europe, as Ontario lacks the agricultural network of organic hop and 
barley growers to keep up with their demand. There are secondary geographical 
considerations when purchasing barley and hops as both of these ingredients require some 
level of processing prior to reaching the brewery. Barley must be malted, and Beau’s is 
limited by the fact that the closest certified organic malting facility is located in Washington 
State. “To purchase Canadian grain from the prairies and have it shipped to the West Coast 
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and then to Eastern Ontario is much less efficient than ordering grain from Europe which is 
shipped by boat and delivered to the port in Montreal,” (ibid.) one hour away. Further, the 
companies that distribute Canadian malt also buy grain from the Midwest states, so it is 
difficult for the brewery to guarantee that the malt is in fact Canadian3.  
Similar considerations exist for hops. While there is an increasing number of local 
hop farms, the crop should ideally be dried and pelletized prior to use to be of value to the 
company. Purchasing manager Jeff McCauley noted that “90% of brewers using Ontario 
hops are using them in wet hopped beers, which are released as a seasonal Harvest Ale to 
take advantage of the harvest in the autumn and the marketing power of being able to say 
that beer was made with 100% local hops,” (Interview, Jeff McCauley, December 9, 2015). 
However, hops are most valuable to a brewing company when they are pelletized, dried 
and stored and can be used at other points in the year. “I work with hop farmers that can 
actually get them pelletized at a certified organic processor, and that’s a challenge,” (ibid.). 
Both Beauchesne and Purchasing Manager Jeff McCauley noted that the company had 
“worked really hard” with the local hop industry. This implies that Beau’s has supported 
new Ontario hop farmers in recent years to start their hop growing business, having 
created the demand locally and committing to buying as much local supply as they can. The 
narrative of the Old 4th Hop Yard reveals the paralleled entrepreneurial partnerships 
between the emergent hop industry and craft breweries. Old 4th Hop Yard is one of Beau’s 
suppliers, based locally in Williamstown, Ontario. They had decided to start their hop farm 
after a tour of the Beau’s brewery and worked in conjunction with Beau’s All Natural, who 
                                                          
3 In discussion with Steve Beauchesne over sourcing local, he made the assumption that when I referred to 
sourcing local I necessarily meant Canadian.  
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signed a five-year contract with them, committing to buying all of their product over that 
period. However, despite this hop farm neighbouring the brewery, the only certified 
organic hop processor in Ontario, Big Head Hops, is located in Meaford, a six-and-a-half-
hour drive away. There are plans for hop growers to open a processing facility locally, 
which Beau’s has stated it will commit to supporting, though the timeline on that project 
was unclear. Beau’s is also working closely with its partner hop producers and 
neighbouring farms to support and promote a network of growers to supply the brewery.  
At present, the Ontario Hop Grower’s Association has forty-two members, and only three of 
those are at a commercial size, which is minimum eight to ten acres. Industry lore states 
that that eastern Ontario was “a major hop growing region 80-90 years ago,” which 
McCauley noted in our discussion.4 The two major factors leading to the hop grower’s 
downfall were crop disease – a challenge that still exists for the hop crops and makes 
organic growing particularly difficult – and prohibition in the mid-20th century. McCauley 
notes that for the production of their local Ontario hops, the brewery can go through that 
volume in a day. It would be worthwhile, for the sake of future studies, to provide an in-
depth look into future of the hop growing industry.  While Ontario can grow a number of 
the major hop varietals that are in demand, there are noticeable taste differentiations 
between growing regions – which is to be expected and has not proven a significant 
problem yet. McCauley also discussed the future of Ontario’s own specialty hops, as 
innovation in that regard is in its infancy.  
                                                          
4 The idea that Ontario was a major hop growing region in the early 20th Century is, in my personal experience, 
passed around commonly in the craft beer industry. While it would have proven too much for this paper, I would 
be interested to look to any archived documents to see what was being grown in Eastern Ontario at the time to 
prove whether this is true or not.  
33 
 
Beauchesne is aware of the marketing value of local purchasing. Being able to state 
that they utilize 20% local hops in the last year seemed to resonate with customers, and as 
the company raises its production each year, the local hop farm suppliers cannot keep up 
which lessen the percentage of local hops Beau’s can say they are using.  
 
4.7 Scaling Up  
Beau’s has experienced a minimum of 35% growth per year since its inception. Each 
year, Beauchesne explained, the company adjusted itself accordingly and reinvested those 
profits in the growth of the business. The company has a capital planning strategy and 
intentions to expand as profit and demand allow. Beauchesne states that they have 
experienced such steady growth that as president and founder of the company, he has been 
generally satisfied with the company’s financial resources and its ability to keep up with its 
equipment and operational needs in a timely manner.  
Staff in the Quality Assurance department noted that the scaling of the business has 
been interesting from a human resources perspective. The Organic Compliance Officer, who 
has worked for the brewery since its earliest stages as a driver and then shifted roles once 
the brewery expanded in 2011, noted that with expansion came the process of converting 
“tribal knowledge” of the brewery – that is, the basic operational practices and company 
information that the earliest employees followed and casually transmitted between them – 
to documented, archived and formalized practices. A number of employees at the company 
remember operating as a staff of fifteen, a stark contrast to the workforce of one hundred 
and thirty today. A number of discussions were had regarding the shift from the small 
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brewery where one person might be required to act as manager, brewer, purchaser and 
salesperson in order to get the company off the ground, and the subsequent transition to 
formalized and specialized roles.   
 
4.8 Company Culture, Employee Satisfaction 
All employees interviewed at Beau’s All Natural reported satisfaction with their 
workplace and compensation for the role they performed there. All employees expressed 
excitement at working at the company, and possessed a deeper feeling of connection and 
purpose in contributing to the craft beer industry. Of employees I spoke with, a number of 
them had gladly relocated to work for Beau’s and were loyal customers prior to their 
employment there.  Beau’s describes its company culture in its posted job descriptions as 
follows: 
“Beau’s All Natural Brewing is a close-knit, family-and-friends company. We take 
collective pride in creating unique, wonderful and organic craft beer, conceived with honest 
consideration for the environment and our local communities, and delivered with a sense 
of friendly relationship. A job with Beau’s All Natural means joining a new family – 
including all the family outings, eye-rolling humour, and wacky siblings you can handle. We 
have an assertive company culture of camaraderie, strong leadership, ethics, innovation, 
passion, and genuine enthusiasm for what we do. Life moves pretty fast at Beau’s All 
Natural. We have names, not titles. We brew using equal parts art and science. And we 
always have time for our friends!” (Beau’s All Natural Brewing Co., 2016). 
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One employee interviewed had relocated to work for Beau’s in its early stages and 
despite educational credentials that qualified him for more senior tasks, took on the role of 
company driver until 2011 when the company was able to utilize his specialized skillset in 
the Organic Compliance and Quality Assurance departments. This commitment suggests a 
high level of company morale, a sense of belonging and a deep sense of purpose within the 
organization.  
 
4.9 Independence, Ownership & Company Structure 
Beauchesne readily spoke to the value of remaining independent within the 
corporately concentrated landscape of the Ontario beer industry. He feels that his company 
is and has been able to grow steadily and responsibly throughout its existence without 
private investment or relinquishing any ownership. As a member of the Ontario Craft 
Brewer’s Association, Beau’s adheres to one of the three major tenets of Craft, of which one 
is to remain independently owned. The Beauchesne family and the company at large are 
deeply committed to the company’s integrity and feel that allowing for any outside 
investment or allowing the company to go public would compromise what makes Beau’s 
the brewery that it is.  
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5.0 CASE STUDY: Church-Key Brewing 
 
 
Source: churchkeybrewing.com 
Church-Key Brewing is a sole proprietorship that has been in operation since 2000 located 
in Campbellford, Ontario. Owner John Graham employs 12 between his brewery and 
community pub, two businesses he operates separately, but in practice there is much 
fluidity between the two. The brewery is located in a repurposed United Church building 
operating at a steady two thousand hectolitres. The company distributes from Cornwall to 
Windsor along the main corridor with some distribution north as far as Huntsville in the 
summer. Church-Key sells through various licensees throughout Ontario, a number of 
LCBOs and The Beer Store. Primarily, Church-Key is known for its innovative beer styles 
and reliably high quality product. 
 
5.1 The Story 
 Church-Key identifies, from the time it opened, as craft brewery number eleven in 
Ontario. A small number had opened and then closed in the province before 1999, but at 
the time of the brewery’s opening, there were ten others in operation. John Graham had 
been a brewer at Amsterdam in Toronto for a number of years until he decided he wanted 
to open his own small scale, locally focused brewery where he could remain small and 
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manage relatively contained operations. However, this humble vision was made difficult by 
particularly prohibitive policies at the time as well as a limited access to basic resources.  
 
5.2 Start-Up Challenges 
Prior to 2006, “you were paying $30 a hectolitre” (Interview, John Graham, 
December 15, 2015) in excise taxes which was a particular strain on the small business 
Graham had created. Once the federal excise taxation system became tiered, Church-Key 
was able to pay ten percent of that rate since the brewery operates at the smallest tier. This 
was the first and most notable challenge Graham cited.  
At the time, there were a number of infrastructure challenges that were 
unavoidable. Gilbertson and Page (now Brewer’s Supply Group Canada), the grain supplier 
that the majority of new breweries purchase grain from, did not yet exist at the capacity it 
does now. To acquire malt, Graham had to buy from Canada Malting, shipped from Thunder 
Bay, with the only stock available to a small brewer being “the Molson/Labatt rejects…” in 
that it was the leftover grain not selected by the foreign owned breweries. “You had to go to 
where the majors were buying their stuff” (ibid.).  
Graham also noted that acquiring financing was exceedingly difficult at the time. 
Banks were particularly skeptical of the brewing business and would not discuss giving 
Graham a loan to start the brewery.  The only financing option available was a Government 
Guaranteed loan for $250,000, with a 3% insurance paid on it. This meant that Graham 
paid $7,500 in insurance and a $500 application fee to borrow at 7% interest. Anecdotally, 
Graham also noted that he has had to liquidate an RRSP, sell his house and take out extra 
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debt to keep the brewery afloat through the years. The church building is owned in full by 
John Graham, bought for $69,000 in 1999. He reported a $500,000 start-up.  
Graham is aware that these financial struggles were of the time, and noted that there 
are a number of financing options available to the brewing entrepreneur now, observing 
that banks are eager to lend to breweries now as they are high cash flow businesses. There 
are also a number of Ontario Government grants available to breweries through OMAFRA 
and Ontario Economic Development that have taken effect since 2011, though he notes that 
“they tend to favour companies aiming to be bigger than us” (ibid.). Graham’s preference to 
remain small runs contrary to the economic growth goals of these grants and has placed 
Church-Key under the radar in a number of regards. 
 
5.3 Successes 
Church-Key’s success has stemmed from staying true to its initial philosophies and 
its intended size. John Graham’s intentions in starting the business were to remain small, 
predicting what capacity he could handle while achieving a work life balance. He also feels 
very strongly against the notion of growth as a company’s main metric to success. Through 
remaining small and a sole proprietorship, he has been able to remain flexible and hold 
himself accountable. “If Molson and Labatt wanted to take us all [craft brewers] out next 
year, they could buy all of the barley in the world if they wanted to. If that happened, I’d 
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just start making Gruit Ales5” (ibid.).  As a small company, Church-Key can remain flexible 
in the face of broad industry changes.  
 
5.4 Sustainability 
John Graham has championed sustainability in the Campbellford area for a number 
of years, and these practices have been entrenched in Church-Key’s business practice at 
different times. In 2006, Graham ran in the riding as the federal Green Party candidate. The 
year prior, Graham and his employees at Church-Key made their own Bio-Diesel for their 
delivery trucks using restaurant waste vegetable oil on site at the brewery. They were 
forced to stop this practice as their insurance company threatened to cancel the brewery 
policy.  
Church-Key was an early adopter of Bullfrog Power, a popular alternative green 
energy provider, though it was found to be too expensive to maintain. Church-Key staff are 
avid composters and recyclers, and the walk in fridges have heat recovery units which 
reclaim heat to be utilized in heating brewing water. Graham often finds inventive 
opportunities to make the brewery systems more sustainable, and he attributes the ease of 
application of these practices to the contained size of the brewery.  
                                                          
5 A gruit ale is a beer that is made using herb mixtures instead of the traditional hops and barley 
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Source: Church-Key Brewing website <www.churchkeybrewing.com>) 
John Graham sources ingredients as locally as possible within cost effectiveness, 
especially when easily available. When asked about going organic, he explained that he 
would never want to be as it is less cost efficient, the availability of quality ingredients 
would decrease and he feels that it would be the “environmentally less responsible thing to 
do,” (ibid.)  based on distance ingredients would have to travel to reach him and 
inconsistent sterilization requirements for breweries.6  
 
 
                                                          
6 Graham discussed that under organic compliance regulations, brewers need to sterilize equipment with caustic 
soda – a corrosive chemical that is dangerous to use and would then go down the drain – which he feels goes 
against environmental practices.  
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5.5 Perspectives on the Industry 
Graham attributes the growth of the industry to the local food movement, which he 
sees as having been influenced by information sharing and social media. The availability of 
information on their food and beverage products, he argues, has allowed consumers choice 
that they did not have when only big breweries had access to advertising on a broad scale.  
Graham remembers a time when brewers would subscribe to one publication that was 
released six times a year to keep up to date with the brewing industry, which is now made 
obsolete by the various communication channels that currently exist.  
As for the industry’s weakness, Graham’s perspective is that the big breweries are 
getting bigger and acquiring craft breweries at an alarming rate. To a brewery the size of 
Church-Key, particularly A. B. Inbev is seen as a bully corporation, and the acquisition of 
Mill Street Brewery in Toronto by this conglomerate was condemned. 
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6.0 CASE STUDY: Muskoka Brewery 
 
Source: Muskokabrewery.com 
Muskoka Brewery has existed since 1995 and operates in Bracebridge, Ontario at 45,000 
hectolitres per year and employs 110 at roughly 80% full time, and 20% part-time. 
Muskoka owes its place in the market to brand recognition by the Toronto cottaging crowd. 
Gary McMullen, President of Muskoka Brewery operated the brewery as a labour of love for 
its first ten years since Federal Excise tax on brewers and sales channel limitations made 
growth difficult. Muskoka distributes throughout Ontario, a number of North Eastern states 
and until recently Western Canada. Muskoka is speculated to be the second largest Craft 
Brewery in Ontario. 
 
6.1 The Story 
The idea for Muskoka Brewery was started by partners Gary McMullen and Kirk 
Evans in the mid-1990s. The pair had taken note of the number of small scale breweries 
establishing themselves in Ontario, as well as being avid homebrewers themselves. Prior to 
founding the brewery, President Gary McMullen was an aerospace engineer in Ottawa 
working for the military. The progression of breweries that were Muskoka’s predecessors, 
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such as Creemore, Upper Canada and Brick, were fascinating to him. McMullen left the 
military in 1994, after which he approached Kirk Evans with his entrepreneurial idea. 
Muskoka Cottage Brewery opened its doors on June 15th 1996. Muskoka Brewery is 
considered to be of the second wave of craft breweries. 
The brewery gradually solidified its place within the Bracebridge community and its 
cottage owners, utilizing localized marketing imagery that was recognizable to cottage 
goers in the region.  
Tragically, partner Kirk Evans passed away in January 1997 after a fatal car 
accident. This major upset occurring so soon after the brewery had opened its doors is one 
of the major moments McMullen references in describing the passion, integrity and 
perseverance he feels his company espouses. 
 
6.2 Start-Up Challenges: “You worked really hard and at the end of the day there 
was no money” 
A major challenge for McMullen in starting Muskoka Brewery was low consumer 
acceptance. The market concentration that the larger breweries held at the time, the lack of 
diversity of beer products available and the effective advertising campaigns of the major 
breweries throughout the previous decades had convinced consumers that “beer was a 5% 
yellow fizzy beverage.” Muskoka Brewery entered the market at a moment when the 
product was understood as a commodity and consumers had limited access to nor any 
literacy for different beer styles.  
44 
 
McMullen explained that this issue was exacerbated by the brewery’s location in 
Bracebridge, Ontario, a particularly small, northern town.  Bracebridge at the time was no 
exception to the common lack of access to a diversity of food items (Food Secure Canada, 
2015) and adjusted to the change in products gradually, largely through the strong sales 
and educational efforts of representatives from the brewery. The core target demographic 
was Toronto, where there was a larger market to sell to, and that extended to those that 
owned cottages in the area.  
A particular challenge at the time was selling product through licenced 
establishments, as locals who ran those establishments and their customers who did not 
understand the product nor Muskoka’s mission. Through perseverance, Muskoka 
representatives insisted they were working toward the rebirth of an industry.  
Muskoka Brewery has faced many of the pivotal policy challenges unique to brewers 
head-on throughout its existence. Until 2001, excise duty on all beer produced in Canada 
was taxed at the same rate regardless of the output of the brewery. The implications were 
that Muskoka Cottage Brewery in its start up phase was paying equal excise duty rates as 
giants Molson and Labatt. “The taxes we were paying accounted for 21% of net revenue – it 
was more than our payroll taxes by far.”  (Interview, Gary McMullen, November 23, 2015). 
By 2001, through dedicated lobbying that McMullen participated in on behalf of Muskoka 
Brewery, the Federal Excuse Duty switched to a tiered system:  
“For beer produced in Canada, it was announced that new reduced rates of excise 
duty were to be tiered according to a licensed brewer’s beer production in a calendar year, 
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and would not apply to licensed brewers whose annual beer production is greater than 
300,000 hectolitres,” (Canada Revenue Agency, 2006).  
That year, Muskoka Brewery went from paying the full excise rate – which would 
have been anywhere between $25-$30 per hectolitre (Canada Revenue Agency, 2006) to a 
tenth of that.  Two years later, Provincial excise duties were similarly changed to reflect 
smaller scaled companies. Those changes in taxation were fundamental to the success of a 
small scale brewery, which Muskoka observed first hand. “Those two changes overnight 
changed what a profit and loss statement would look like for us,” (Interview, Gary 
McMullen, November 23, 2015). 
With this gradual shift throughout the 2000s as taxation policies began to take their 
full effect, the craft beer industry began attracting investors who were seeing from the 
outside that brewing could be profitable.  
 
6.3 Current Challenges 
Gary McMullen readily stated that it was a “great public policy success” that they 
were able to make such great strides lobbying the Provincial and Federal governments for 
scaled taxation. However, they continue to be hampered by the retail systems for beer in 
Ontario. He acknowledged that there is a fine line between a blown open retail system and 
one that promotes competition, and at present they do find they run into a number of 
challenges. They feel that another breakout is required to deregulate the industry a bit 
more than it currently is. 
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The new legislation that allows beer to be sold in grocery stores continues to 
represent heavy regulation and, by McMullen’s interpretation, is still heavily controlled by 
big foreign breweries. McMullen explained that “the big breweries are in talks with the 
Liberal government to control at least 75% of that retail space over a 10-year framework.7” 
He notes that it’s “never a good day when you have to sell through your competitors.” 
Managing cost side challenges can also be difficult in terms of ordering resources 
like hops that are “technically commodities.” They will contract hops out 3-4 years in 
advance – which is investing in futures that, because it is an agricultural commodity8, 
cannot be guaranteed. As a result, there is some risk associated with that end of the 
business.  
Further, since the recent New West Partnership between British Columbia, Alberta 
and Saskatchewan, which gives preferential taxation to local brewers in the region, 
Muskoka Brewery offered a public statement condemning this policy move and pulled out 
of those Western Provinces. The company feels that the policy promotes divisiveness 
among Canadian craft breweries and speculate that the move was in part influenced by the 
foreign owned breweries. Muskoka believes in developing the Canadian craft network, thus 
their sense of local appears to be Canada wide.  
 
 
                                                          
7 It is very possible that this piece of insider knowledge that McMullen has access to is correct, though I am unable 
to confirm if those negotiations are occurring.   
8 Gary McMullen’s words, though hops could be too small of a production crop to technically qualify as a 
commodity.  
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6.4 Successes 
Muskoka Brewery owes its success to a number of factors, the first of which being 
its resolve to never quit. As McMullen stated, original business partner Kirk’s passing 
within a year of opening the brewery was a pivotal moment when the Brewery could have 
just as easily closed operations. “The first few years were a real challenge, but our can-do 
attitude and finding a way to get the job done, no matter what, has been integral to our 
success.”  
Muskoka’s product is by their admission and by reputation, of high quality and 
consistently so. Muskoka Brewery also puts emphasis on maintaining direct human 
relationships with its customers to instill a sense of trust in the industry. This effort to 
instill trust is reflected in the company’s website content, communicating the company’s 
beliefs. While many food and beverage companies may find benefit in loose labelling 
standards on their product, Muskoka Brewery has gone as far as explaining a labelling 
loophole they could benefit from as an alcohol company that is not required to provide a 
full list of ingredients, but instead use their short ingredients list as a marketing strategy 
and an opportunity to influence trust in the company.  
“Purity 
We believe you should know exactly what your beer is made of. Alcohol is the only 
consumable product that doesn’t legally require a full list of ingredients. What 
makes Muskoka Brewery different? The ingredients on our labels are what we 
actually use to make our beer!  
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Here’s what you won’t find in our beer. There are no additives, no preservatives and 
no adjuncts (cheaper ingredients or those that shortcut the brewing process). And 
we never pasteurize. We brew beer the way it’s supposed to be made. This is our 
passion and our promise.” (Muskoka Brewery, 2015) 
The brewery is well capitalized and says it invests heavily in people and quality 
equipment to support those people properly. They are seen as a lead the industry in how 
employees are compensated, which works alongside with high expectations of those 
employees.  
 
6.5 Marketing Strategy  
Muskoka has five core brands in stock at all times, which is a notably different 
strategy than other breweries with one flagship brand and one or two secondary brands. 
Mad Tom IPA, Twice as Mad Tom IIPA, Detour, a seasonal that shifts based on the season, 
Cream Ale, and a core Wheat Beer. Detour is their biggest seller, followed by Mad Tom IPA 
and Cream Ale. By always offering five core brands, the company covers a large fraction of 
the beer styles gaining the most popularity in the province.  
Muskoka distributes through all three major sales channels on Ontario, as well as 
selling in the States and other parts of Canada. The company recently pulled out of the 
Western provinces as it was too expensive for the company to justify (see discussion 
above).  
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The company relies on local connection and identity with its brand. “If you are up 
north… and a true cottager, you think of Cream Ale,” (Interview, Kristin MacDonald, 
November 24, 2015). They balance Muskoka regional nostalgia with innovation in brewing 
styles and forward-thinking trend starter campaigns.  
For example, Mad Tom was the first West Coast IPA launched on Ontario with all 
three major marketing channels. Muskoka was able to push this marketing campaign with 
ample resources, which placed them ahead of others developing IPAs. It changed the 
landscape of beer in Ontario with its visibility, strong backing and far-reaching distribution. 
This was a forward-thinking campaign on their part, noting that the Ontario market is 
growing at 24%/year in the IPA category9. Similarly, Detour was the first Session10 IPA in 
Ontario, launched in January 2014. The company frequently claims space as first movers in 
the market and reason out which trends are going to “fit us, [that] we believe in,” 
(Interview, Gary McMullen, November 23, 2015). 
Muskoka has had much success with private, independent licensee in Toronto 
within the last five years, especially the Toronto West End, which has a heavy 
concentration of licensees. The Muskoka brand is overall well received, and they claim to 
be one of the fastest growing breweries in Ontario.   
 
                                                          
9 IPAs, or India Pale Ales are a hoppy beer style in the broader ale category, which have gained popularity in the 
craft beer industry. The reasons for their popularity are up for debate, though it is possible that their hoppy, bitter 
profile serves as such a distinct contrast to the bland commodity lager that it is a go-to style out of a need for 
differentiation. 
10 A Session ale is relatively low in alcohol as well as mellow in flavour. Many breweries release these during the 
summer months as they are meant to be refreshing.  
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6.6 The Future of Differentiation 
A common theme in all interviews at Muskoka Brewery was a concern surrounding 
the concept of the fake craft brands: that is, brands being marketed as “craft” by the large 
foreign-owned companies Molson, Labatt and Sleeman. All interviewees took time to 
analyse the concept of the “Premium” beer in the 1990s as the word that summed up 
quality of choice, and the gradual adoption of that word within many breweries’ marketing 
campaigns loosened its parameters. Muskoka projects that the definition of “craft” will 
prove equally fluid and that through well-funded advertising campaigns, the foreign 
breweries will be able to likewise convince consumers of the quality of their products.  As a 
result, Muskoka makes a point of prioritizing authenticity in all aspects of their business 
practices.  
 
6.7 Local Economic Impact 
Muskoka Brewery is within the top ten employers in the Muskoka region, and they 
are of the top five in Bracebridge. The company maintains a strong connection with local 
conservancy initiatives and is partnered with Habitat for Humanity ReStore.    
 
6.8 Sourcing 
Muskoka’s approach to purchasing ingredients and equipment is buy as local as 
possible. Muskoka’s definition of local appears to be within Canada as first preference and, 
failing that, North America. The lack of availability of Ontario grown hops and grains has 
51 
 
meant that Muskoka sources ingredients from the closest place they can retrieve the 
highest quality. Where they cannot get a specific flavour profile for various malts, they do 
on occasion import from Europe. For example, they have imported small quantities of 
chocolate malts from a company called Bairds in the United Kingdom, as it cannot be found 
in North America.   
Muskoka Brewery does have a passion for supporting local “when it makes the best 
business sense” (Interview, Gary McMullen, November 23 2015). They work with local 
manufacturers wherever possible, and “those products must meet specification, be of good 
quality and be priced competitively” (ibid). 
Muskoka does have a history of utilizing local crops for specialty ingredients. In the 
winter, the company released a seasonal brand called Winter Beard, a double chocolate 
cranberry stout, which uses cranberries grown close by in the town of Bala, Ontario.  
 
6.9 Sustainability  
While Muskoka Brewery has not yet formalized sustainability procedures, the 
company is in the process of hiring a third party sustainability consulting firm to identify 
opportunities for environmental efficiencies within the company. They will work with this 
organization to identify their current environmental footprint by their metrics and use that 
to inform the company’s next steps.  
In terms of industry standard sustainability, McMullen noted a number of 
considerations brewery owners must take into account, though the answers are never 
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simple nor can they be perfect. He noted that there are often economic impetuses behind a 
sustainability strategy, e.g. water conservation reducing costs as well as having 
environmental benefit, and hopes to approach sustainability for the brewery with 
thoughtful consideration.  
 
6.10 Scaling Up “We want to grow rapidly, but we want to grow responsibly” 
The company had been “growing in spite of itself” since its inception in 1996. Many 
years were hit and miss due to excise tax expenses, with profit and loss statements 
fluctuating depending on the year. “Under the old tax regime, if you had a good year it was 
alright, and if you had a bad year it was really bad. We had no ability to withstand any 
spikes in terms of our earnings” (Interview, Gary McMullen, November 23, 2015). The 
company had grown at the time through the help of friends and family who acted as a 
network of thirty-five to forty shareholders holding small portions of the business. They 
needed to reduce the shareholding numbers and increase the investment substantially to 
plan for the long-term.  
As new taxation policies took effect and the sector experienced growth, McMullen 
had his eyes out for the right investor. While there were many who could have been a poor 
fit, he eventually partnered with Bob MacDonald in 2008, who had grown up cottaging in 
the region. He invested the required funds in the company to hit its stride.  
“It’s important to note that those tax changes that were implemented were 
fundamental to this business getting to where it has gotten to. People from the outside 
might see overnight success, you can plot our growth rates and see the blips upwards with 
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each policy change, and finally when the investment dollars came in in 2008 when we got 
the capital we really needed to hit stride, then it really started to take off,” (Interview, Gary 
McMullen, November 23 2015). 
 
6.11 Company Culture, Employee Satisfaction 
Employees interviewed at Muskoka reported very high job satisfaction and a strong 
belief in the mission and vision of the company. A number of employees have seen the 
company through its major growth period; of the two employees interviewed, both 
anecdotally referred to the time their employee number was sixteen or twenty, and 
referenced that the workforce has grown to over one-hundred now. They are optimistic 
about the growth of the company and report they feel rewarded by the company for their 
work. 
To promote morale, the company conducts a number of programs and organizes 
regular staff retreats. One of these is anonymous in-house company surveys frequently for 
feedback from employees, which it was reported has been effective in making employees 
feel heard and valuable.  
A similar in-house program, designed to connect employees to the product is the 
Moonlight Kettle program. Each month the company brews a one-off beer from an original 
recipe. A brewer from the brewing team will choose partners from anywhere in the 
company and work as a project team to develop a new beer. “It’s a mini business unto itself 
where they bring this beer to life, like an innovation pipeline. It gives our people time to 
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experiment, make mistakes, fail – create time and space for that to happen and to cultivate 
leaders” (Interview, Gary McMullen, November 23 2015). 
Importantly, at the top end, Gary McMullen feels very strongly about the Living 
Wage Canada program11, and hopes to participate as an official Living Wage Organization 
once the program moves into their area. Management takes in to account the cost of living 
in the community of Bracebridge, and the various communities where their sales 
representatives are located and what wage those employees must have to stay in the area. 
The company has adjusted wages accordingly and presently identifies itself as a Friend of 
Living Wage Canada and is excited to force the adoption of the Living Wage program in the 
area.  
Overall, the company has a sense of itself as having a “passion for people and for 
making a difference. Muskoka Brewery as it exists in the beer industry, in Canada and the 
world, is a vehicle for us to make the difference we want to make in the world – the 
company gives us the capabilities to make those changes” (Ibid.). 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
11 Living Wage Canada is an organization that promotes for wages that “reflect what earners in a family need to 
bring home based on the actual costs of living in a specific community. The living wage is a call to private and public 
sector employers to pay wages to both direct and contract employees that are sufficient to provide the basics to 
families with children” <livingwagecanada.ca> 
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Muskoka’s company value statement is as follows:  
  
6.12 Ownership & Independence 
Muskoka is dedicated to remaining independent and developing their local 
economy.  The company and its management have had a strong role in lobbying 
government at the federal and provincial levels for the benefit of small scale, independent 
brewers. President Gary McMullen spent a number of years as Chair for the Ontario Craft 
Brewer’s Association and places a high priority on remaining authentic, creating jobs 
locally and remaining a Canadian-owned company.  
 
WE have resolve. We work hard and are unwavering in our beliefs. The connection that we feel to 
this place that we share has made us strong and determined. We are passionate about beer and we 
will make our mark. Competition only strengthens our resolve to be a leader. 
 
WE are authentic. We draw inspiration from the natural wilderness that surrounds us. Our beers are 
a reflection of us; genuine and unfiltered. 
 
WE are thirsty. We are not afraid to venture of the beaten path to create and forge new ways of 
doing things. That is how we are built. 
 
WE are caring. We care about each other and the well-being of our community. We are 
approachable, understanding, and patient. We strive to make our community a better place. 
 
WE are all unique. Our diversity makes us stronger as a team. We support and listen to each other. 
We teach and learn from each other. We laugh and celebrate together. 
 
There is only one Muskoka.  It is a special place where rugged granite outcrops and lonely windswept 
pines meet the shimmering beauty of freshwater lakes. Unspoiled natural beauty is what people find 
here in Muskoka. This place is our home. It is at the heart of what we brew. Go ahead, taste it. 
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6.13 Perspectives on the Industry 
Policy changes provided part of the fuel for the growth, but Muskoka sees that what 
is happening in craft beer is part of the larger trend of food and is as a result of the Local 
Food Movement and notes the growing reconnectedness consumers have with food. 
Comparing the beer industry to the growth of the wine industry, and noting that the 
Ontario Government was open to developing that sector they feel “bodes well for the 
industry.”  
All three interviewees from the company noted the concept of a “market correction” 
or “history repeating itself” in discussing the changing landscape of beer, in developing 
beer style diversity but also with the relocalization of manufacturing jobs. “Craft beer is the 
new manufacturing, people are connected to their communities again” (Interview, Kristin 
MacDonald, November 24 2015).  
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7.0 CASE STUDY: Block Three Brewing Co. 
 
Source: Blockthreebrewing.com 
Block Three Brewing Company was founded in September 2013 by four friends: three 
accountants and a brewer. The company employs ten people, with six full-time and four 
part-time. It operates at approximately two thousand hectolitres presently with twenty 
barrel fermenters.  
 
7.1 The Story 
The brewery is located in the centre of St. Jacobs, Ontario, a small town located 
outside of Kitchener-Waterloo. The town has a large Mennonite population and is a tourist 
destination for Kitchener-Waterloo residents. It has a large farmer’s market as well as a 
number of artisanally focused shops on its main strip. 
The process of opening the brewery began in January 2013, when the four friends 
had come together to draw up a business feasibility plan. They pinpointed St. Jacobs as an 
ideal location due to its steady influx of weekend tourists seeking out niche, crafted 
products. The assumption was that a local brewery would add to the local flair of the town 
and be profitable.  
58 
 
The partners approached the township to see if it was feasible and the township 
suggested a building and enthusiastically approved the project. The four partners then 
drew up a feasibility plan, rented the building, and opened on April first of that year. The 
four partners placed emphasis on developing a retail space to sell out of. The brewery has 
an open back end, which allows customers to see where the beer is made and interact with 
the brewing process. 
The partners developed their marketing strategy from a piece of advice they were 
given by an LCBO representative: “own your backyard,” which meant developing their 
business locally in the Kitchener-Waterloo region. This means logistically they do not need 
to hire extra delivery people nor sales reps. They sell through craft beer bars in the area, 
but most of their volume is sold directly from their retail space. They have approximately 
30-40 licensee accounts in the area, but the retail space allows for the highest margin and 
allows for the most genuine brand interaction with the customer.  
 
7.2 Challenges 
One of the owners, Graham Spence, described the major challenge as “getting [the] 
product in front of customers,” noting that Ontario alcoholic beverage retail laws are 
prohibitive to small businesses and cater to larger companies, referencing the macro 
brewers, but also larger craft breweries that have reached certain economies of scale12. 
Owners of this brewery noted that the nature of craft beer and smaller businesses is that 
                                                          
12 Among these larger craft brewers were Muskoka and Beau’s. 
59 
 
they are inherently inefficient. “What would take them two people to do, might take us five 
people to do. We don’t have automation… we are an inefficient operation compared to 
them.” The owners of Block 3 feel that the beer retail policies in Ontario are hindering the 
growth of the industry and employment for people in the province by creating a number of 
barriers to entry for start-ups. 
Another challenge noted was the competition for tap space with licensees. While the 
brewery has a quality product and good brand recognition, at times these two factors will 
not be enough in the competitive craft brewing market. There are a number of breweries 
that will move volume and compromise their price point to undercut the competition, 
which Block 3 cannot afford to do. Block 3 strictly sticks to their prices and notes 
frustration with the competitive, cost-cutting market.  
Owners at Block 3 also note the trickle-down effect of legislation and policies and 
the basic logistical disadvantages they can cause. For example, as a small start-up brewery, 
distribution requires coordination, labour time and mileage costs that are all absorbed by 
the brewery. An LCBO policy that was recently changed13 dictated that “cottage” brewers 
(i.e. under 75,000 hectolitres) could only deliver to points of sale (i.e. LCBOs, TBS, 
licensees) directly, or use the TBS distribution services. Small brewers were not allowed to 
pool deliveries with each other, or use a third party distribution service. In that sense, the 
macro brewers have the advantage of having The Beer Store’s in-house delivery services to 
deliver for them at no extra cost to them. Spence expressed that he found this unfair. 
                                                          
13 As will be discussed in the policy analysis section of this paper. 
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Block 3 also noted that their major competition after the foreign owned breweries 
are contract brewers. The idea behind contract brewing is that one could contract out all 
the services to have beer brewed with a generally hands-off approach and create a 
marketing experience of being a small scale craft brewery. “It goes against the OCB 
definition of craft beer, they’re kind of cheap money makers and are just marketing 
companies at the end of the day” (Interview, Graham Spence, December 15, 2015).    
To the question “what do you wish you had more resources to do?” Spence 
explained that the organic growth of the company has meant that there is not a wish for 
further resources. If there were more capital, they may open a brew pub in downtown 
Kitchener. The brewery will be investing in a bottling line as its next major step, which will 
increase efficiencies. Labour, packaging and taxes were cited as the greatest expenses to 
the brewery.  
It was also noted that acquiring licencing was a lengthy, bureaucratic process in the 
start-up stages, that took a number of months during the period of time the brewery was 
under construction. The general sentiment was that the licencing process felt prohibitive 
and discouraging to the new entrepreneurs. “It just took way too long. It could have been 
weeks, but it was months” (Interview, Graham Spence, December 15, 2015).14    
 
 
                                                          
14 I attempted to obtain more information about the licencing experience, but my main contact, Graham, could 
only speak about it vaguely, explaining that it was his business partner who was tasked with the process. That 
partner was unavailable for interview. 
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7.3 Successes 
Block Three’s greatest strength has been its welcoming retail space and its company 
atmosphere.  
The company has actively involved itself with its surrounding community, 
maintaining presence at local events and engaging with the residents of St. Jacobs and the 
Kitchener-Waterloo region. This type of outreach bodes well for the brewery’s following 
and creates return customers. The brewery has a mug program, where return customers 
can have their own mug on site that is theirs to drink from when they come in to the space, 
which “creates a sense of local pride.” They had these mugs made by a local potter, which 
adds to the authenticity of the program. “It makes people feel like they are a part of Block 3, 
it’s personal recognition” (Ibid.). 
The brewery has also given itself a niche edge by brewing Belgian beer exclusively, 
which has a unique flavour profile, and is cheaper to brew due to lower hop content (which 
are often the most expensive ingredient) and quick product turnover (because it ferments 
and conditions quickly, unlike lagers). Spence noted that not a lot of breweries are brewing 
Belgian beers on a full-time basis. Further, a mild Belgian Saison will often have a similar 
crispness to a lager, meaning it is an accessible introduction to alternative beer styles for 
those used to drinking a commodity lager from a macro brewery.  
Graham attributes much of the brewery’s success to having a business plan laid out 
and a keen eye for size-relevant efficiencies, financial literacy and cost effectiveness. “If you 
put the time and energy into doing a business plan, you can be successful. You need a 
balance of people with ideas and people with the business sense” (Ibid.). Block Three was 
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started with a low input model, in that the owners invested in the base requirements for a 
minimum output – they started with three barrels – and sold out in twenty-four hours. This 
has meant that they have experienced organic growth and have been actively working at 
growing responsibly as they continue to sell out of product. Spence noted that many 
breweries that opened at a similar time to Block Three opened at large capacity and were 
generating volumes that did not have guaranteed sales, which seemed too high risk to the 
owners of Block Three. 
Spence reported that funding the brewery was relatively easy. The owners 
approached the bank with a well prepared business plan that the bank was impressed with, 
putting few things at risk, taking out minimal additional debt. They did not leverage on 
investors, and do not at present intend to.  
 
7.4 Ingredient Sourcing 
Block Three sources its ingredients and materials “as local as possible,” though 
there are limited channels to acquire basic brewery necessities in Canada. Block Three 
acquires its malt from Canadian Malting, and is not opposed to sourcing specific malt 
varieties from Europe if need be. As for hops, some are sourced locally from Ontario, 
though not a large percentage as there is no maturity to the hop supply in Ontario to 
sustain the beer industry.  
Spence noted that the company sources bottles from Spain, which feels redundant 
as the brewery is located on the same street as an artisanal glassmaker with many more in 
the region, but they do not make industry standard bottles.  
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7.5 Perceptions of Growth in the Industry “We were told what to drink for too 
long.” 
Block Three’s sense of the industry’s growth is that a first mover followed by a 
snowball effect took place since the 1980s. There was a gradual realization that beer was 
more than the yellow lager, and we all have different palettes. “All it took was… the first 
person that went out and did it and produced a good quality product and growth happened 
from there. The possibilities have changed in the sector” (Interview, Graham Spence, 
December 15, 2015). Block Three, similarly to other breweries, refer to the growth of the 
sector as a “market correction” as opposed to a shift.  
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8.0 Discussion 
8.1 Common Success Factors 
The majority of interviewees attributed the growth of the industry to the prevalence 
of social media and information sharing. With internet-based channels, consumers have 
been able to engage with beer products in a manner impossible before those technological 
advancements, a stark contrast to the mass televised advertising campaigns of Molson-
Coors and Labatt of the mid-20th century, which positioned lager as commodity beverage 
for mass consumption (McLeod, 2014). Through social media sites such as Twitter, 
Instagram and Facebook, which are all free to use, small scale brewers with minimal 
budget or time for marketing and promotion can advertise and engage with consumers 
directly. Of the four breweries interviewed for this paper, all utilize these three main 
channels of social media. Beau’s All Natural consciously opted to cut costs by utilizing in-
house marketing techniques with social media channels at the core of its marketing 
strategies and relied heavily on word-of-mouth. In bypassing major marketing and 
advertising channels such as television, radio and print media, these small to medium 
scaled enterprises avoided unnecessary costs and were able to build on direct 
identification with their brand.  
In the early days of the industry, those who followed craft beer self-identified as 
“beer geeks” and would participate in online forums such as www.ratebeer.com or 
www.beergeeks.ca. Two interview subjects for this paper proudly claimed to have been 
active users of ratebeer.com, particularly in its earlier stages, and claim to be well 
networked among the growing beer industry as a direct result of their involvement with 
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the website. Favourable reviews on any of these self-proclaimed “beer geek” websites, 
especially in the early 2000s, would build word-of-mouth recognition for an otherwise 
unknown beer brand and generate demand for the product. Clemons et. al. (2006) argue 
that there is a correlation between high internet ratings on a beer product and its sales 
growth, a common observation in niche markets. There is a sense among the craft beer 
industry that the community has its origins in these online fora and recognizes breweries 
that achieve high ratings.15 
The perceived benefits of social media marketing for start-up companies cannot be 
denied (Celuch, 2014; Murphy et. al. 2007; Clemons et. al. 2006). Many small brewers’ only 
connection with the growing industry prior to social media, especially when situated in 
rural settings such as Church-Key Brewing, were quarterly publications or occasional 
conferences once the community of small brewery owners in Ontario became large enough. 
Research has shown the benefits of internet-based communications and promotion to 
SMEs in the twenty-first century (Celuch et.  al., 2014; Sparkes & Brychan, 2001). The 
existence of well-developed social media channels at this moment of industry critical mass 
has provided small brewers a cheap and effective marketing channel where there did not 
used to be one. For the sake of future studies, it would be interesting to explore the role of 
social media channels in aiding in the development of local food networks in Ontario. 
 
 
                                                          
15 In my own experience as staff at a brewery with particularly high ratings on ratebeer.com, I was instructed by my 
superiors to push this fact as a central component of sales pitches. 
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8.2 Know Your Own Backyard: Local Focus & Company Growth 
A major success factor noted in all four case studies was the concept of starting the 
business by developing locally-focused sales channels and a locally-embedded company 
identity. Each case brewery is located in a rural or semi-rural setting, where the brewery 
acts as a destination point. The growth of these companies in rural communities has helped 
generate a sense of place for locals and appears to have generated local tourism in each 
locale, which is in keeping with Plummer’s (2005) findings that revealed the value of 
beverage tourism to stimulate local economic activity. All four brewery owners or 
presidents noted a sense of local pride in their product, with Steve Beauchesne referring to 
support of Beau’s beer in the Ottawa area akin to “supporting [their] local sports team.” By 
using a locally-focused model, the four brewers studied have created jobs in their 
communities and created or added to sense of place in their local economies. Muskoka 
Brewery is among the top five employers in the Bracebridge area, while Beau’s is similarly 
one of the largest employers in Vankleek Hill. Beau’s also brings in upwards of 14,000 
visitors each year for its Oktoberfest festival, a tourism presence that far outstrips the 
town’s population of around 2000 (Statistics Canada). Each company maintains an active 
role in its community by sponsoring local charities, events and community initiatives. Each 
company’s branding and slogans nod to their local identities, with Beau’s tractor 
symbolizing its small town roots; Block Three acquired its name from the first plot of land 
deeded to one of the first settlers of the area and names its brands, such as Pushbroom 
Porter, after iconic artisanal goods made in the town. Church-Key appeals to its local 
history and identity in a number of ways, the most obvious being its honouring of the 
church building it is housed in; Muskoka has used iconography of the Muskoka chair, pine 
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trees, and various other cottage symbols in its branding. Shuman (2013) agues that vibrant 
networks of small businesses at the local level will have the strongest impact on economic 
prosperity and are some of the biggest agents in creating local cultural identity. The four 
breweries listed here exemplify this concept.   
The casual nature of distribution channels such as small, independent licensees has 
contributed to the growth of the industry. The ease of relationships between similarly 
scaled SME’s (Lester; Lipinski, 2015) has meant that craft brewers have had an available 
sales channel that may not have been present without the local food movement, a 
sentiment all four brewers interviewed share. McMullen described the nature of these sales 
relationships in the early days of the brewery to include a significant amount of education, 
since the local licensees had not developed a taste for the product in the 1990s and early 
2000s. Through cultivating close relationships with these licensees Muskoka was able to 
work directly with bar and restaurant owners as well as consumers to generate interest in 
its different styles of beer. 
While Church-Key is unique in its intentions to remain relatively small scale, the 
four brewery presidents expressed differing definitions of local scope on both the supply 
chain and marketing ends and what it means to their business model. Ingredient sourcing 
provided for rich discussion in this regard since available channels are limited in Ontario. 
Older breweries such as Church-Key and Muskoka described their experiences sourcing 
malt exclusively through Canada Malting in their earlier years, which was the only supplier 
at the time. Canada Malting is a subsidiary of the international company GrainCorp Malt 
group, so even if the grain is exclusively Canadian grown, the company itself is not 
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domestic. The general sentiment was that sourcing locally meant sourcing North American, 
since to source from a national or provincial scope would mean very limited access to 
resources. While each company’s president expressed that they would ideally source all 
ingredients and equipment locally (from Ontario) if available, the common sentiment was 
that required ingredients and equipment were either not available locally or the supply 
was limited, unreliable or expensive. The common theme was to address those decisions 
with a nuanced approach, taking into consideration a desire to support local while also 
accounting for other factors such as cost, availability and quality.  
In terms of geographical sales markets, each brewery at least began its business 
model with a local focus. Gary McMullen at Muskoka noted that there was a personal touch 
that differentiated Muskoka Brewery from other breweries. He noted that the company’s 
strength was that employees maintained a connection with customers and “someone 
would always answer the phone [for customers].” Of the four case studies; Muskoka is the 
largest company as of Fall 2015, with the company vision “to be Canada’s most trusted and 
iconic beer brand,” revealing Muskoka’s sense of itself as a nationally recognized brewery. 
In its earlier years as a small brewery, Muskoka primarily appealed to the Bracebridge area 
locals and cottage owners, with its earliest brands resonating with many as an essential 
symbol of local identity. Muskoka’s outward expansion goals took effect after 2009 when 
the company gained a major investor, which speaks to the fact that Muskoka operated for 
thirteen years with its sights on almost exclusively its locally available markets.  
Church-Key Brewing is unique among the four cases as the company was started 
with the express intention of remaining small and community-minded and placing 
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conscious limits on the company’s growth. Owner John Graham sought to open his own 
brewery for the work-life balance he hoped that being his own boss would provide. Graham 
noted a number of tensions inherent in remaining a small-scaled company in a system he 
feels offers power to larger companies.  
Block Three drew up its business plan in 2013 with a consciously local focus. The 
brewery was given advice from local LCBO representatives to build its business locally 
through in-house retail and licensee relationships. Thus far, this appears to have worked 
well for the brewery.  
The discussions surrounding the New West Partnership were revealing in gauging 
perceptions among the four craft brewers of what qualified a local market. The two most 
extreme examples were Muskoka Brewery and Church-Key Brewing. Since the Alberta 
government used this partnership agreement to give preferential tax rates to local 
producers of alcohol, Muskoka Brewery pulled out of Western Canada, as costs to 
distribute there became too high and discouraged competition in the region. Muskoka 
Brewery’s president expressed that he was a heavy proponent of a universal progressive 
tax structure for the industry, so that breweries could compete anywhere in Canada with 
the ability to grow into tax rates. This position was a stark contrast to Church-Key’s owner, 
John Graham’s stance on the matter. As a brewer with no interest in expansion to Western 
Canada, he felt that craft breweries that were lobbying for the right to compete in the 
Western Canada market had possibly become too big and ran the risk of running small 
brewers of roughly the same scale as his brewery out of their markets. These viewpoints 
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revealed that the definition of local spans from all of North America, to Canada and to 
Ontario depending on the point of discussion for brewers.  
 
8.3 Company Growth 
Company growth was commonly regarded as a loaded term that required further 
discussion and explanation from three of the four brewery presidents. Growth as a goal 
unto itself seemed to be associated with the macro brewers or large multinational 
companies. Each discussion on company growth goals led immediately to a reflection on 
business ethics and assigning value to those growth goals beyond finances – none of these 
were strictly economic nor financial discussions. This notion of growth as at worst 
potentially harmful or at best requiring added nuance echoed Victor’s (2008) notion that 
growth as a policy objective in a macro economic sense is narrow minded, does more harm 
than good by overuse of resources, and does not inherently promote prosperity. These 
discussions about company growth goals offered some micro, firm-level context to these 
broader ideas.  
At Beau’s All Natural, owner Steve Beauchesne expressed “growth is not the goal, it 
is a symptom. If we are doing the right thing the right way, we will be rewarded with 
growth. [We are] neither anti-growth, nor pro-growth… we’re too big if I can’t sign the 
Christmas cards to our customers, or if one of our accounts wants to do a beer dinner and I 
can’t accommodate.” Beau’s is an interesting case study in this regard as Beauchesne seems 
to view his business as an experiment to see how successful the company can be while 
maintaining its business ethics. Until recently, business ethics and economic growth have 
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been viewed as mutually exclusive, though there is growing acceptance of contingencies 
between the two (Eisenbeiss et. al., 2015) as evidenced by the success of Beau’s. He 
explained that his goals for company sustainability come before any goals for growth. 
“Growth has allowed us to do some of the things that make us a better brewer. We are not 
too big if we are able to afford new equipment that in turn can improve the quality of our 
beer.”  
By contrast, at Church-Key, John Graham not only intends to remain a sole 
proprietor, but has maintained production levels of two thousand hectolitres per year. He 
expressed in our interview that he felt that by remaining small, he could be resilient to 
major economic shifts as well as remain accountable to himself and his community. He also 
feels very strongly about maintaining the work-life balance that running a steady, small 
company can provide. He readily criticized breweries such as Beau’s for having no set cap 
on company growth, as he feels it is central to business ethics.  
The largest case brewery, Muskoka, presents itself as a nationally-scaled brewery 
and has intentions to be so. However, there was still rich discussion with president Gary 
McMullen regarding the struggles with economies of scale – i.e. that Muskoka was at a 
disadvantage for being its size compared to the macro brewers - and the problems inherent 
in growing too large. McMullen expressed the sentiment that “unbridled capitalism is never 
good,” which influenced much of our discussion. Similar to Beau’s, McMullen expressed that 
the company’s ethics were “worked backward from” to get to its yearly growth goals. “We 
want to be clear on why we are here and what makes our heart beat. [As a company] we 
want to make a difference in our communities and the world… [we see ourselves as] taking 
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up a leadership position in the industry to fight “untoward activity” that the macro brewers 
may have created for us. We want to grow the company rapidly, but we mostly focus on our 
team making a difference in the world and we work backwards from there” (Interview, 
Gary McMullen, November 23, 2015). In this case, there was no cap on company growth as 
the greatest virtue of company ethics, but an approach that is similar to the triple bottom 
line or shared value approaches (Elkington, 2004; Kramer & Porter, 2011).16 
Block Three had little to say on the abstract idea of company growth, in part because 
it is still in its start-up phase. However, there were a number of sentiments expressed that 
nodded to the challenges of being a new, small start-up with no economies of scale in a 
market that they felt favours companies with economies of scale.  
The differing perspectives of what growth targets look like for each brewer offer 
further questions regarding ideal growth goals for SMEs that seek to contribute to local 
economic growth.  The concept of company growth is quite broad and complicated, but it 
conjured up a number of sentiments regarding the problems inherent in uncapped growth, 
and company values. 
To marry the economic discussions surrounding craft beer, on the one hand we have 
Swaminathan’s (2013) resource partitioning theory, which explains the movement as a 
number of specialists rising to meet niche market needs while generalists (i.e. the macro 
brewers) meets the broader need of supplying the commodity to the market in its most 
basic form, while on the other hand we recognize craft beer as a possible rise of a more 
                                                          
16 Notably, when McMullen was pointedly asked about growth goals, his answer was immediately a description of 
the company’s why statement – and not a percentage that I was expecting. 
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equitable economic market that does not necessarily value growth above all things. The 
two do not appear to be mutually exclusive; resource partitioning serves as an explanation 
to what market demands may have driven the growth of the craft beer segment initially, 
though a low growth, or steady-state macro economic model explains what factors may 
lead to the sustainsbility of this industry as a specialist field. If a low-growth model values 
localized prosperity at a community level above GDP growth, then breweries which have 
been shown contribute to local economic well-being (Menna; Catalfamo, 2012) should be 
ideal firms to flourish in a more balanced economy. Certainly, there can continue to be a 
place for generalist organizations such as Molson-Coors and Labatt to serve a segment of 
the market, but ideally the market should be more equitable for new entrants and SMEs 
that do not wish to grow to the massive scale of the macro brewers.  
 
8.4 Efficiency 
 Efficiency was unsurprisingly a loaded concept in each interview. Given the history 
of the drive for economy of scale, Ford assembly line tactics and the value of providing the 
consumer with the lowest price point possible that defined the beer industry in Ontario for 
so many years, the four case brewers held a self-consciousness surrounding their 
“inherently inefficient”17 operations. The smallest brewer, Block Three, used the phrase 
“because we’re inherently inefficient, we are at a disadvantage” in response to a number of 
interview questions including sales tactics and packaging. Their definition of efficiency was 
overarching and suggested that not having an economy of scale like the macro brewers did 
                                                          
17 Graham Spence, December 2015; Gary McMullen, November 2015 
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placed them at a disadvantage. Mainstream economic theory of efficiency generally 
assumes that firms seek to maximize profit by minimizing the input used to produce a 
given level of output (Stigler, 1987). In this sense, the brewers were referring to adding 
technological efficiencies to their operations. Technological efficiency can be defined as the 
ratio of the amount of benefit derived per unit limited resource (Ayres, 1989). 
Church-Key is a similar size and owner John Graham noted that certain specific 
efficiencies, particularly environmental ones, in operational systems could be attained, but 
his goal has always been to have a steadily running small business.  
 Most interesting was the discussion of efficiency with Muskoka president Gary 
McMullen, who questioned the very concept and drew connections with Victor’s (2008) 
critique of progress, efficiency and economic growth being an end instead of a means. He 
used the regulated alcohol sales systems in Ontario to make a powerful point about the 
short-sighted nature of defining efficiency in such narrow terms: “What does efficiency 
mean in the context of economic prosperity? A beverage alcohol retailing system that has 
three thousand drop points [of sale] compared to the one in Ontario now that is half of that 
is not as efficient at delivering beer to market, but it sure does leave more money in the 
economy. And when there is more money in the economy you have twenty-thousand more 
people working in the industry, making money, sticking it in their pocket and then 
spending it … I think we have to learn that maybe efficiency is not the king, and perhaps it’s 
[about] balance” (Interview, Gary McMullen, November 23 2015). He also expressed that 
despite not having the economies of scale or vertical integration that the foreign-owned 
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brewers had, there was inherent value in being a genuine company and making beers true 
to style.  
 At Beau’s, efficiencies were discussed in a more direct way. Beauchesne expressed, 
similar to Block Three, that with more financial resources the company could invest in 
equipment to increase efficiencies to streamline processes. This is interesting since the two 
companies are at very different sizes and possibly speaks to an efficiency treadmill effect 
that business owners inevitably end up on. Binswanger (2006) speaks to economic 
treadmill effects on individual well-being – particularly the time-saving treadmill, which 
assumes we will find technological opportunities to save time anywhere we can, but that 
we will always necessarily fill any extra time saved through those efficiencies with new 
issues, creating a paradox. A future study on the treadmill effect on increasing efficiencies 
in SME business practices would be interesting.  
 The concept of efficiency evoked similar responses among the case breweries, with 
a common self-consciousness regarding inherent inefficiency based on company scale at 
each brewery size represented here. Only Church-Key expressed a contentedness with its 
efficiency of operations, which perhaps stems from that brewery’s lack of interest in 
growing any larger than it is. 
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8.5 Sustainability 
 
Source: Google image search: Used.ca 
The concept of sustainability was addressed in each interview to varying degrees. 
To spark this conversation, I asked each brewer what their stance was on industry 
standard packaging, referencing the stubby bottle which went out of circulation in 1983. 
The stubby is often referred to as the pinnacle of industry sustainability, as each major 
brewery at the time (of which were almost exclusively macro brewers) used and recycled 
the same bottles18 in a reciprocal agreement (CBC, 1983). The stubby was ditched for the 
long neck bottle, as differing bottle shapes and sizes allowed for higher visibility, 
differentiation and branding opportunities. Their responses revealed much about their 
individual stances on sustainability regulation in the private sector and their own priorities 
when it came to applying sustainability principles to their businesses. Of the four 
breweries, two championed sustainable business practices and held deep opinions on the 
                                                          
18 These bottles could be washed and reused an average of 20 times.  
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role of sustainability within their businesses. These two were Beau’s All Natural and 
Church-Key.  
At Beau’s, sustainability and a broader sense of business ethics combined with 
marketing thereof has been a key strategy to the business’ success. Beau’s is a certified B 
Corporation, a third-party certification organization that requires its companies to “meet 
rigorous standards of social and environmental performance, accountability, and 
transparency” (B Lab, 2015). The certification standards go so far as to require that 
companies incorporate certain accountabilities into their Articles of Incorporation and 
legal governance structure as a commitment to the mission of the company and to provide 
legal protection of that mission. Further, B Corp requires regular, stringent reporting on the 
impact of its businesses utilizing B Impact Assessment.19 The word Steve Beauchesne used 
to describe his approach to sustainable business practice was “mindful,” a word that was 
used to encompass taking all things into consideration, but placing sustainability and 
company integrity at the forefront of the business – an approach that has led to the 
company’s financial success. There is growing research and an increasing number of 
success stories to suggest that this approach to sustainability has been a strategy for 
success for SMEs (Eisenbeiss et. al., 2015) and the added value of B Corp reporting 
accountability strategies adds to evidence of the viability in incorporating sustainability 
into business practices. Beau’s provides a case study to support these claims.  
                                                          
19 Business ethics reporting metrics and accountability can be subjective and have their own body of research on 
their effectiveness, though there is a growing respect for the Benefit Corporation movement and the B Impact 
Assessment metric (Ng, 2013). 
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 To the discussion surrounding industry standard bottles as a vehicle for industry-
wide sustainable practices, Beauchesne was quick to point out that the impetus behind the 
macro brewers using standardized bottles at the time was cost effectiveness and that to 
hold up any one practice as the only way forward lends to dogmatic thinking about what 
sustainability and environmentalism is. It is worth noting that Beau’s packages their beers 
in unique, non-standard bottles.  
By contrast, in the case of Church-Key Brewing, the integrated sustainability approach 
looks quite different. Owner John Graham self-identifies as an environmentalist and, as 
mentioned in the case study, ran for office under the Green Party of Canada. He has always 
sought to integrate sustainability into his business practices and is proud of that fact. When 
asked about the industry standard bottle, of which there are a number that line the walls of 
the brewery, Graham held strongly that the stubby was the pinnacle of environmentalism 
in the industry and was highly critical that something so practical and environmentally 
impactful had lost its place in society to marketing interests.  
 
Source: Church-Key Brewing. <www.churchkeybrewing.com> 
79 
 
At Muskoka, sustainability has not historically been at the forefront of the business 
model, but the company will be hiring a third-party consulting firm to identify 
environmental efficiencies to adopt. President Gary McMullen spoke to the fact that the 
stubby had been to beer companies’ economic benefit during its reign between 1962-1983, 
and was not an environmentally-based decision at all.  
Sustainability was not as prominent a discussion at Block Three, but when asked about 
standardization of packaging part-owner Graham Spence was skeptical about a practice 
that would limit brand differentiation, as they rely on product and brand differentiation for 
their company strategy. 
 
8.6 Industry Camaraderie 
Feedback from each brewery revealed a sense of community and camaraderie among 
craft breweries.  Steve Beauchesne expressed that his favourite thing about the industry 
was that he is friends with a number of other brewery owners and industry workers – 
including John Graham, owner of Church-Key. Jeff McCauley expressed that in his role at 
Beau’s, “there is a lot of collaboration with other brewery purchasers/owners, whereas 
purchasing in other industries can be very competitive, even secretive” (Interview, Jeff 
McCauley, December 9, 2015). Craft brewers are ready to share their secrets of the trade 
and they often collaborate on speciality one-off products, or if a fellow craft brewer is 
located close by, share ingredients when one is running short. 20 Beauchesne discussed 
                                                          
20 Casual industry knowledge of my own experience working at Black Oak Brewing Co.  
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something he referred to as “the good of craft,” that is, the friendliness, collaborative 
nature, passion and integrity of the industry. He feels that “we’ve got something special that 
needs to be protected. It’s not just Labatt buying us little guys out, it’s the venture 
capitalists coming in to the industry looking to make millions and get out – if they don’t 
have the good of craft at their core, the industry will change into a typical, competitive 
industry… we’re anti-business (in this industry) in so many ways, and that’s what makes it 
so special. Nothing worries me more than losing that” (Interview, Steve Beauchesne, 
November 11, 2015).   
It is interesting that with the present growth of this industry, as it approaches market 
saturation, these entrepreneurs would not view their peers as competitors. Perhaps this 
can be attributed to the fact that many breweries focus the majority of their sales in their 
immediate area, but it likely has more to do with the passion of these entrepreneurs 
running so deep that they are pleased to see the success of the industry in whatever form it 
takes.  
 
8.7 Financing 
A point of interest from the four case studies was the differing stories of each 
company’s start-up capital procurement. When asked about start-up challenges, Beau’s, 
Church-Key and Muskoka Brewery offered their anecdotes of difficulty in financing through 
a banking system that was skeptical about lending to beer entrepreneurs at their times of 
opening, which were 1996, 1999 and 2006 respectively. By contrast, Block Three 
volunteered that securing financing through a conventional bank to open that brewery in 
81 
 
2013 was a point of ease. A proven strength Block Three had in this regard and more 
broadly in the success of the business in its short lifespan thus far was presenting a well 
laid out business plan (Becherer; Helms, 2009), aided by the professional accounting 
backgrounds of three of the four owners. Similarly, one could make the argument that the 
professional background of Steve Beauchesne of Beau’s All Natural as a business analyst is 
evidence of a skillset that contributed to the success of Beau’s. Research indicates that the 
adoption of effective strategy based on previous entrepreneurial or industry experience 
can help reduce impact of resource shortages that are inevitable when in start up phase 
(Harris; Gibson; McDowell, 2014).  
While the two largest breweries did not discuss hard figures, the smaller two 
breweries interviewed21 offered very different interpretations when asked “how much 
would it cost to open a brewery?” Feedback from Church-Key, which dealt with start-up 
costs in 1999, estimated roughly $1,000,000 to account for real estate, equipment, 
insurance, ingredients and any other inclusive costs. By contrast, the entrepreneurs at 
Block Three, whose estimations are based on experience from 2013, estimated $250,000 
with no hesitation. The differing viewpoints of these two brewery owners reveals an 
interesting generational difference in the landscape for beer entrepreneurs between the 
late 1990s and now, and speaks to the present maturity of the industry.  While it is difficult 
to pinpoint exactly what accounts for cheaper start-up costs now versus then, the 
perception of these differences is quite telling. By John Graham, a seasoned beer 
entrepreneur’s perception, the financial barriers to entry would have increased due to 
                                                          
21 It was easier to discuss financing with the smaller companies; the larger ones were well financed and preferred 
not to discuss in detail.  
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inflation, hiked real estate prices and the lack of availability of used equipment. However, 
my understanding22 is that with regards to availability of equipment and supplies, ease of 
acquisition should increase as the shakeout side of the industry continues, as start-up 
breweries that fail would theoretically sell their equipment.23 Gary McMullen also noted in 
his interview the increasing number of North American brewing equipment manufacturers 
since his company’s earlier years. Graham did express that at the time of his start-up, 
suppliers and equipment only had one channel and it is a basic economic principle that 
increased competition lowers cost of products (Smith, 1776) so it is quite possible that 
Graham’s bias stems from his long tenure as a brewer through more difficult times.  
Financing a brewery has also become a more accessible feat due to grant 
opportunities through the Government of Ontario since the introduction of the Ontario 
Microbrewery Strategy in 2011. In 2014, the Ontario Government provided nearly $3.5 
million in funding to various breweries throughout the province through programs such as 
the Ontario Local Food Fund, the Rural Economic Development Fund and various other 
economic development programs. Beau’s All Natural received $354,000 in 2014 through 
the Ontario Local Food Fund (Government of Ontario, 2014), and Block Three was the 
recipient of $35,000 though the Rural Economic Development program. Block Three’s 
intended purpose for this funding is to purchase new bottling and labelling equipment 
“which will enable the firm to produce larger quantities of its product, expand distribution, 
                                                          
22 From experiences with brewery start-ups outside these case studies: Together We’re Bitter Brewing Co-op in 
Kitchener Waterloo that opened February 2016 acquired cheap, used brewing equipment from Bavaria. While I 
was not provided with full costs of their equipment, they acquired their equipment with ease.  
23 Hard numbers data has been difficult to prove and obtain using this particular method of case study research. 
Since these companies are small and privately owned, requesting detailed financial information is generally 
frowned upon. I wonder what my results would have been had I approached these companies as a BBA student 
analyst, and whether I would have been met with defensiveness.  
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and increase traffic to its tasting room,” (Government of Ontario, OMAFRA news bulletin, 
September 2015). To place these figures into perspective, the cost of a standard bottling 
line, an essential piece of equipment that impacts branding, quality and shelf life of the 
product, has been quoted at anywhere between $50,000 to $100,000 depending on the 
size, quality and whether it is being bought used or new.24  
 
8.8 The Market Correction 
Each case brewery sees the growth of the craft beer industry as a “market 
correction” as opposed to a shift or a new development. Gary McMullen of Muskoka refers 
to it as the “rebirth of the industry.” Steve Beauchesne explained “if you think back to the 
time before craft existed … the marketplace was shaped 80% macro and 20% imported 
premium beers. Those imports were evidence that there was a market for differentiated 
beers, and there were people who were looking for something good if they didn’t like the 
basic lager. But the problem with imports is necessarily they won’t have that freshness 
people look for. That 20% are looking to Ontario to provide their beer now.” He also feels 
that craft may reach market saturation at 15% (Beer Canada’s25 2015 Annual Report, 
released in early 2016, cites craft at roughly 10% currently). Beauchesne’s view is that 
ideally craft will reach 15-20% market share and will probably never go above 50%. This 
view is in keeping with the resource partitioning theory (Swaminathan, 2010) and the long 
                                                          
24 Casual knowledge from working in the industry. 
25 Beer Canada is the trade association that represents the macro-brewers on a national scale, though a number of 
smaller-scaled brewers hold membership such as Muskoka Brewery.  
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tail theory (Anderson, 2012) that have been used to account for the growth of craft markets 
in other regions.  
 
8.9 Common Challenges 
Representatives of each brewery noted the concept of “fake craft” as a major 
challenge facing the industry. By fake craft, interviewees were referring to the concept of 
brands owned by macro breweries being marketed as craft. Indeed, in 2014 Labatt was 
reported to have spent $2.7 million on marketing a pre-existing brand under their umbrella 
as craft (AB-InBev, 2014; Appendix II). With the craft category growing at such a rapid clip 
in the LCBO, it is unsurprising that the macro breweries are responding to their loss of 
market share. Brewers interviewed for this paper were unsure of the way forward with 
this particular challenge, however there was diversity in stances on whether this particular 
competition was detrimental to the growth of craft. The president of Beau’s All Natural’s 
stance was that he felt these pseudo craft brands would act as a gateway to real craft for 
the mainstream beer drinker.   
All interviewees from Muskoka Brewery commented on the threat of the fake craft 
brands and expressed their greatest challenge to be differentiation in the face of this 
competition. It is possible that this particular brewery responded so viscerally to this 
challenge because as one of the largest craft breweries in Ontario, this brewery may be 
positioned to act in more direct competition to Molson-Coors, Labatt and Sleeman 
compared with the other breweries studied here. President Gary McMullen noted that 
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Muskoka’s disadvantage compared with the macro breweries was in its economy of scale, 
but ultimately believes that “efficiency is not the king” in creating quality beer.  
In a similar vein, the newest, smallest brewer, Block Three, expressed their major 
challenge in the market to be contract brewers. Contract breweries are those that contract 
out any part of the brewing process, whether it is space and equipment where a hired staff 
member brews at a location not owned by the brewery, or paying another brewery to 
produce the product in its entirety to be branded with the name of the contractor. As a new 
brewery operating out of a brick and mortar facility, the sentiment is that contract brewers 
are not the real deal in terms of being a craft brewer. Common to these challenges is a 
tension and defensiveness in defining what constitutes real craft versus what others who 
are not reigning true to the definition of craft are doing.  
 Brewers that hold membership with the Ontario Craft Brewers Association are 
welcome to use the OCB seal in their branding, and the LCBO does discriminate in terms of 
only allowing Ontario craft brewers as defined by the OCB placement on designated 
Ontario Craft Brewer’s shelves. It is interesting that third-party certification for craft 
brewers has not been put forward as a potential solution, though it is possible that these 
brewers feel their membership with the OCB is certification enough. There have been 
findings to suggest that the marketing efforts of the OCB have been successful in this regard 
already, so perhaps the answer lies in continuing to develop those efforts (Oppenheimer, 
2008). 
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9.0 Sales Channels: Analysis & Discussion 
This section will expand upon some of the major feedback the craft brewers interviewed 
had in selling their product through the sales channels available to them.  Some key themes 
throughout were: difficulties in dealing with large, publicly run organizations such as the 
LCBO as a small scale company; limited merchandising opportunities with the LCBO, TBS 
and grocery retail; and the high costs of working with TBS. The most notable was the 
discrepancy in power dynamics between small scale brewers and large retailers, though 
the nuances inherent in the in-person sales relationships provide rich discussion for 
solutions to these major challenges.  
 
9. 1 On-Site Retail 
Ontario breweries are able to sell product on their manufacturing site. A number of 
interview subjects for this paper agreed that selling through on-site retail is by far the most 
profitable method of selling product, as margins can remain high with no middle man. This 
method also allows for a face-to-face interaction between brewery employees (or owners, 
depending on the size of brewery) and consumers. There are a number of limitations 
placed upon brewers in operating a retail store, and the model allows for very little 
expansion in this regard.  
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Beer tourism has been a great benefit to small scale brewers operating in rural areas 
of Ontario, especially those with a storefront in a tourism heavy centre (Plummer et. Al., 
2005, 2006), as was the strategy at Block Three Brewing. Block Three also expressed that 
with more financial resources, their expansion strategy would be to open a brew pub to 
build on the brand awareness that their on-site retail store has created. 
 
9.2 The Beer Store  
Brewers Retail is the main sales channel for breweries of all sizes in Ontario, 
operating under the trading name The Beer Store (TBS). To sell through this channel, 
“CRITERIA AND REQUIREMENTS FOR AN ON-SITE BREWERY RETAIL STORE  
 
 The applicant must be a brewery with a valid manufacturer’s licence issued by the Registrar. 
 The applicant must submit to the Alcohol and Gaming Commission of Ontario a properly 
completed application form for an On-Site Brewery Retail Store Authorization, together with 
the necessary supporting documentation.  
 Where the applicant seeks to operate one on-site brewery retail store, the store must be 
located on the same parcel of land as the applicant’s main production site where the full 
brewing process takes place. The full brewing process includes, without limitation, mashing, 
lautering, boiling, hop separation, fermentation and packaging.  
 Where the applicant seeks to operate two on-site brewery retail stores, one store must be 
located on the same premises as the applicant’s main production site where the full brewing 
process takes place and the second must be located at another production site of the 
applicant where the full brewing process takes place.  
 The applicant is eligible to apply for authorization to operate two brewery retail stores, 
provided that each brewery retail store is located at a production site of the applicant (as set 
out above) and provided that at least fifty per cent (50%) of the beer sold in each store is 
made by the applicant at the site of the retail store where it is being sold.  
 The applicant must make all of its products in Ontario using the full brewing process 
including, without limitation, mashing, lautering, boiling, hop separation, fermentation and 
packaging,” (AGCO, 2016). 
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breweries must pay a listing fee of $25,880 (Brewers Retail Inc., 2014) upfront to list in 
100 stores. “This fee is made up of the one-time base listing fee of $2,880 plus the one-time 
fee of $230 per store on the first 233 stores selected [to list at],” (ibid.). To be part of The 
Beer Store, brewer’s pay upfront, then per SKU, then per store.  
This particular sales channel has been a point of tension and controversy for Ontario 
craft brewers, since Brewers Retail is owned 49% by Molson-Coors, 49% by Anheuser-
Busch InBev (Labatt), and 2% by Sapporo. This is an ownership structure that places sales 
of brewery product in the hands of three of the world’s largest brewers and the largest 
brewer in Canada. For many brewers, this especially sours the upfront fees paid to list their 
products as those fees directly or indirectly are to the benefit of The Beer Store’s owners, 
craft beer’s major competition. Further, the governance structure is similarly 
misrepresented, with only token attempts to include craft brewer’s voices. Brewer’s Retail 
board of directors includes five seats for Molson-Coors, five seats for AB InBev, two seats 
for Sapporo, two seats for large craft brewers, and finally one seat for a small craft brewer. 
The craft brewer’s seats were implemented in 2014 as a response to ownership and 
governance controversy, as this particular power structure gained media attention that 
year. 
TBS claims to be a retail and distribution system “operating on a cost recovery 
basis,” which leads the layperson to believe that The Beer Store, as it is independently 
incorporated does not technically make any profit, which is the technicality that allows TBS 
to claim it is not a monopoly. Any profit above breaking even gets funneled to the owner 
breweries in the form of dividends.  Sen (2013) found in a comparative economic study 
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with Quebec beer sales retail profits that TBS brings in $700 million per year that is 
unaccounted for by expenses. Additionally, Beer Stores that are known to move high 
volume will charge double the listing fee to stock in those stores as they hold that 
discretion.  
Beyond the high listing fees, another roadblock to craft brewers selling through TBS 
is a lack of access to merchandising. A brewery sales employee expressed frustration with 
the new computerized touch screen system, which is an inherently inefficient and non-user 
friendly system. TBS employees are prohibited from offering recommendations on product 
and merchandising in the beer store is intentionally prohibitive, because “The less 
information they provide you, the more profit they [the large breweries] make” (Interview, 
Erica Campbell, January 6, 2016). 
This flawed system is presently undergoing some major shifts, however. TBS and 
the Government of Ontario are well aware of the inherent controversy that exists 
surrounding The Beer Store as craft breweries are the fastest growing segment. In April 
2016, the Premier’s Advisory Council on Government Assets published a report entitled 
“Striking the Right Balance: Modernizing Beer Retailing in Ontario” which focuses largely 
on restructuring the ownership and governance of TBS under proposed “The New Beer 
Framework.”  
While The New Beer Framework proposes that TBS begins to offer more 
merchandising opportunities for suppliers, the document does not outright detail what that 
means. It does set out that all TBS locations will be walk-in and open concept shelved by 
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the end of 2017, which is a great improvement from the mysterious back-end, 
alphabetically ordered wall sticker system.  
In January 2015, TBS threw a bone to craft brewers offering small brewers no listing 
fee when stocking two new products at the five Beer Store locations closest to their 
brewery. The development as stated in The Beer Store’s release to all suppliers is outlined 
below: 
  (Internal email, January 2015) 
 
9.3 Liquor Control Board of Ontario 
The Liquor Control Board of Ontario (LCBO) was formed as a result of the Liquor 
Control Act in 1927. Following the prohibition era, the Ontario government sought to take 
control of alcohol sales and “subjected alcohol consumption to its disciplinary gaze,” 
(Thompson & Genosko, 2009). The government organization has evolved throughout the 
years from being an alcohol consumption control organization that tracked consumption 
on an individual basis to the alcohol retail empire it is now. The LCBO is now one of the 
“Small Ontario brewers (those that sell fewer than 1 million litres/year at the Beer Store) 
will pay no listing fee when stocking two of their products at the five Beer Store locations 
closest to their brewery; 
Beyond those five stores, small brewers will be able to list the same two products at any 
additional Beer Store location at reduced listing fees, paying only the per-store fee; 
Small brewers have also asked for the ability to introduce seasonal brands throughout the 
year. Yesterday, the Beer Store announced the implementation of this change. Brewers can 
swap out a new or existing brand listing and replace it with a seasonal brand twice a year at 
no additional cost.” 
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largest buyers and retailers of alcohol in the world, due in large part to its monopoly status 
on selling spirits in Ontario. For craft brewers, one brewery owner interviewed for this 
paper referred to the organization as “a necessary evil” and another referred to them as 
“the gatekeepers.”  
For brewers to sell through the LCBO, they must meet laboratory, packaging, 
labeling and bar code requirements. While there is a relatively low listing fee to sell 
through the LCBO, brewers are charged a fee of $135 per product per year for annual lab 
testing on products that are not distributed through the warehousing system.  
Brewers may conduct their dealings with the LCBO one of two ways. Larger brewers 
may elect to take advantage of the warehousing system, wherein alcohol manufacturers 
respond to company wide inventory requirements based on stock in the five LCBO 
warehouses. Theoretically, this system seems logistically simpler, as a brewer would only 
have to deliver to their nearest warehouse and the rest of the product movement and sales 
would be dealt with internally by the LCBO. However, a number of brewery employees 
interviewed for this paper reported the warehousing system to be frustrating and 
challenging. There are few craft breweries that still utilize the warehousing system as a 
large number found the were unable to keep up with its demands or maintain a beneficial 
sales relationship with individual stores. For example, under a warehousing system a 
brewery operating at three thousand hectolitres would receive a purchase order for four 
hundred to a thousand cases (anywhere between 100 to 500 hectolitres) from the LCBO 
and be expected to ship it the following day. For breweries that rent their canning or 
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bottling line, have not upgraded to more efficient packaging equipment, or do not have the 
production capacity to keep up, this requirement is difficult to meet.  
The automated computer systems within the store are similarly not beneficial for 
the individual breweries. The warehousing system creates automatic minimums that 
prompt the individual store to order from the local warehouse. These minimums are quite 
low; in interview with Erica Campbell (January, 2016), she explained the warehouse 
computer system will prompt the store to restock the bare minimum of product to the 
shelf, which will often be one case at a time, when for merchandising purposes the brewery 
supplier would prefer to have a stack of five on the shelf at a time for the sake of visibility 
on the shelves. The solution for this issue from the brewery salesperson’s perspective is to 
convince each individual store to raise their minimum for their product in their warehouse 
inventory system – an awkward discussion that few LCBO employees know how to 
address. Encouraging more shelf space for their product is similarly difficult. The 
warehousing system is marketed as cheaper for manufacturers, though its complications 
far outweigh its benefits. 
By contrast, working on a direct delivery system has facilitated much easier 
relationships between craft breweries and the LCBO. To maintain a sales relationship with 
an LCBO involves telephone or in-person contact as email ordering is not an option. Each 
individual LCBO store has an allotted staff member as the go-to for each product category. 
The employee at any given store who deals with beer inventories is referred to as the Beer 
Ambassador26. These direct relationships with each store’s Beer Ambassador, coupled with 
                                                          
26“Many of them are beer geeks, but just as many don’t care about beer at all. They can either be your most useful 
contact and make sales incredibly easy, or they don’t,” explained Erica Campbell. 
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frequent deliveries by a brewery employee to each store allow the brewery to keep track of 
inventory and to cultivate business relationships with the people who deal with direct sales 
of their product. A hands-on sales approach also allows the brewery to ensure that their 
product is making it from the back stock section of the store to the shelf in front of house, a 
complication that is produced often by basic human error.  
Dealing with the LCBO on an individual store basis allows for business relationships 
to operate on a relatively similar playing field. As one of the world’s largest retailers of 
alcoholic beverages, the disparity in scale between craft breweries and the central LCBO 
does cause a number of predictable difficulties. As a Crown Corporation with a number of 
ingrained bureaucracies, foibles such as a misplaced invoice or a minor error can take 
months to fix and the LCBO does not hesitate to withhold payment to its suppliers while 
investigating an error. For a craft brewer this can mean cash is being withheld. “When 
there is a problem with the LCBO, it is really intense to fix. There is no phone number or 
direct contact to deal with your issue – there is an info email and you get the sense that 
things go into the ether,” (Interview, Erica Campbell, January 6, 2016).  
Navigating the LCBO’s system is often referred to as a learned skill that a number of 
new breweries struggle with. The company’s trade website, 
www.doingbusinesswiththeLCBO.com, is supposed to be the resource for all suppliers to 
the LCBO, though two interview subjects reported its content to be vague and impersonal, a 
description confirmed with a quick perusal of the website. A notable indicator of the type of 
online experience a supplier will have with the LCBO is the amount of online login 
usernames and passwords brewers are assigned. One craft brewing sales representative 
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claims to have three that she must remember to do her job. Gaining access to these logins 
can be difficult and delaying. Many breweries allot a full time staff member to navigate the 
LCBO sales channel as its demands can be meticulous.  
For St Jacob’s Block Three, the wait time for a product approval in the LCBO 
reportedly took longer than it should have, and this experience appears to be common for 
craft brewers. Frustrations stem from the length of time it can take for labels and packaging 
to gain approval, as well as the competition for shelf space as more craft brewers attempt 
to sell through the LCBO. To achieve a year round flagship brand on reliable offer in a high 
volume store is considered a great feat for craft brewers, though a number of seasonal 
brands are rejected due to the high volume of brewers offering similar seasonal styles. 
Further, many report27 that the LCBO discriminates based on packaging: at present, tall 
cans are the preferred packaging being accepted by the LCBO, though this particular 
approach is expensive for brewers and offers low margins and requires the product to be 
sold at high enough volume to make it worth the brewer’s while.  
Overall, craft breweries interviewed for this paper reported a relatively positive 
relationship with the LCBO.  The system has eased for small brewers through the last 
decade, with breweries such as Block Three maintaining a healthy business relationship 
with as few as twenty stores in their region, feeling limited pressure to expand to further 
stores. There is pressure to ensure product can sell itself, as the LCBO provides only basic 
promotional programming such as in store tastings and limited merchandising.  Others 
argue that this pressure is normal and represents a level playing field. When a craft 
                                                          
27 Interview with Erica Campbell, Block Three, casual industry knowledge 
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brewery on direct delivery stocks out, there are no real consequences to the brewery aside 
from the frustration of specific stores waiting on product, though many breweries report a 
healthy back and forth relationship with their key LCBO stores regarding their growth. 
Beau’s All Natural reported that, during an earlier growth phase, when they would stock 
out at LCBOs, they gave their LCBO stores an official Beau’s letter to place on their shelf 
space to apologize to their customers and to give a timeline as to when the beer would be 
ready and delivered to that store, a personal touch LCBO employees were happy to oblige.  
Further, the LCBO is known for paying its suppliers in a timely manner when 
protocol is followed. Arguably, the meticulous paper trail the LCBO requires of its 
suppliers, especially on direct delivery basis, is a great advantage for craft brewers to track 
their sales in a manner many small businesses struggle with. Compared with the reported 
frustrations of receiving payment from licensee establishments, as discussed below, this is 
a welcome offshoot of dealing with an organized, well-funded Crown Corporation.  
Funding benefits extend as far as allowing LCBO stores to invest in basic 
renovations such as installing walk-in fridges for beer selection, a great boon to craft 
brewers that do not pasteurize their product. Selling through the LCBO allows brewers to 
ensure their product gets to customers, more often than not, in its intended state. Similarly, 
the LCBO is motivated to move product that has not sold. Beer that has been sitting on the 
shelf too long will be marked down based on its best before date, a contrast with anecdotes 
from the Quebec private sales channels, where small beer retail businesses will be hesitant 
to mark product down as they pay out of pocket for it, resulting in product sold at full price 
past its prime.  
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Merchandising with the LCBO is difficult and can be expensive should a brewer 
choose to buy into things like space in Food and Drink magazine, the LCBO’s bi-monthly 
promotional publication or certain AirMiles partner programs. Much of the colourful 
branding of craft brewers in Ontario is due in large part to a need to differentiate in the face 
of limited merchandising opportunities on LCBO shelves. There is a sense that craft 
brewers in the LCBO struggle to find the perfect balance between offering eye catching 
labelling and remaining within the constraints imposed upon them by the LCBO (the LCBO 
is critical of any labelling that seems to promote unsavoury behaviour, or that makes 
drinking seem appealing to children). That said, the LCBO can on occasion be convinced on 
a case-by-case basis to move product to more visible parts of the store free of charge for 
the sake of visibility. Otherwise, the onus is on the brewery to invest in promotional 
programming for their product. Customer in-store tastings are an opportunity for brewers 
to set up a tasting bar for four hours during peak periods, though the brewer must pay the 
LCBO at retail price for each bottle or can of their product used during the tasting, as well 
as the cost of paying a staff member to conduct it. For product to be put on sale, the 
brewery must pay for the sale to happen unless it is a decision on the part of the LCBO 
store employees to move that product more quickly.  
Some of the challenges craft brewers have had with the LCBO mirror those of small 
scale food producers working with large retailers, particularly in the difficulties of supply-
chain logistics and consumer’s expectations of constant availability (McCallum; Campbell; 
MacRae, 2014). As evidenced by Beau’s story of apology letters placed on LCBO shelves, the 
LCBO’s system, while convoluted has allowed for certain in-person relationships to be 
made between brewery sales representatives, store employees and consumers. It seems 
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that the LCBO’s strategy of a captain for each product category has been quite useful to the 
brewers in that they have a direct contact at each store. Perhaps there are lessons that can 
be taken from these processes that could be applied in other large retailers looking to 
localize.  
 
9.4 Grocery Stores 
Beer sales in grocery stores are a new phenomenon in Ontario, launched 
unexpectedly in early December 2015 when it first seemed slated for Spring 2017. Beer 
sales in grocery stores is technically still routed through the LCBO, with it acting as 
wholesaler of all beer products through their warehouse system.  
The eligibility requirements for grocery stores to sell beer are:  
 
“To be eligible to sell beer, each grocery store must meet a number of characteristics: 
 Location sells a full line of food products; 
 A minimum of 10,000 square feet of retail space is occupied by food products; 
and 
 Location is not primarily considered a pharmacy. 
As committed in the 2015 Budget, the Province has mandated in law requirements related to 
the socially responsible sale of alcohol, including: 
 The sale of beer adheres to standard hours and beer is to be located in a single 
designated section of the store; 
 Beer sold in grocery stores cannot exceed 7.1 per cent alcohol by volume; 
 Beer will be sold in a six-packs or less, up to 750 mL per container” (Ontario 
Ministry of Finance, 2015) 
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As this sales channel is quite new, information gathered from interview 
subjects was speculative. The major feedback with regards to craft beer access was 
that if beer could only be sold in six pack formats, with the maximum alcohol 
content at 7.1% (most imperial IPAs – a common, strong India Pale Ale style - are at 
8% ABV) and that it was exclusive to stores at minimum 10,000 square feet, which 
makes grocery stores a limited channel. The Ontario Government has committed to 
having four-hundred-and-fifty grocery stores selling beer. Three interview subjects 
described it as unfair that the system was not changing fast enough.  
 
9.5 Bars, Pubs and Restaurant Licensees 
Arguably one of the cheapest options, many craft brewers build their brand by 
selling product through a local bar or restaurant. As discussed in Case Study 1: Beau’s All 
Natural Brewing Co., the emerging network of independently owned bars and restaurants 
in the region allowed for the brewery to form direct relationships and to move product at a 
high volume, often in the cheapest container available to them: kegs. The casual nature of 
these relationships has stemmed from the fact that both businesses operate on a relatively 
similar scale, where business owners can form mutually beneficial business relationships. 
These sales relationships are especially easy when the culture of these establishments is in 
line with the culture of the brewery. Beau’s has sought to create a niche, high end product 
with a locally focused narrative, which is mirrored in the small company culture of many of 
their major partner licensees.  
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Sales through small licensees are not necessarily always easy, however. A common 
complaint among brewery sales representatives28 was that there are a number of licensee 
establishments that will not pay on time, or will withhold payment based on not having 
sufficient funds. This was cited as a major inefficiency in selling through the small business 
licensee network.  
Large corporately-owned restaurants and pubs are a channel that craft breweries 
have found difficult to break into. Often, chain restaurants have many years of experience 
partnering with the large foreign-owned breweries, such as Molson-Coors and Labatt, and 
have come to expect to do business on that scale. For example, as outlined in the Block 3 
case study, their owner expressed a major challenge regarding licensee sales as a small 
brewery given price undercutting by larger breweries. Molson-Coors, Labatt or Sleeman 
can afford to provide their licensees with free kegs, branded tables, umbrellas, tap handles 
and even fridges and tap lines with regularity, while a small craft brewery will often not 
have the resources to offer such perks.  
In this section I have attempted to provide a detailed report of the sales channels 
available to craft brewers in Ontario, and what those business relationships commonly look 
like based on the research I have conducted. I believe a general understanding of what 
those business relationships look like and what limitations or capabilities craft brewers 
have within them is essential to business and policy analysis.   
  
                                                          
28 Interview subjects Erica Campbell & Kristin MacDonald; dates in appendix 
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10.0 Policy Analysis 
The word to describe the policies and legislation that oversee the beer industry would be 
reactive. There is a sense that the beer industry has grown in spite of itself since the 1980s, 
with policies shifting to accommodate the gradually increasing lobby of craft brewers and 
their supporters.  
Prior to 2006, legislation and taxation was written as though small scale brewers 
did not exist. Federal and provincial excise taxes on beer manufacturers had every brewing 
company, no matter the size, paying the same tax rate as the large, foreign-owned 
breweries per hectolitre produced, which came out to $31.22 per hectolitre (Canada 
Revenue Agency, 2006). “They accounted for 21% of our net revenue – much more than 
our payroll. It made it really hard to get to profitability at a low volume” (Gary McMullen, 
November 2015). In 2006, the Federal Government altered federal excise tax rates for 
small brewers to a tiered system that had brewers at the smallest tier, 2,000 hectolitres 
and under paying a tenth of that rate at $3.122 per hectolitre. It is worth noting that this 
was Beau’s All Natural’s first year of operations, and as such the brewery was able to reap 
the benefits of the new taxation system from the start.  
Similarly, in July 2010 the Ontario Government introduced the Beer and Wine tax, 
which took the burden of shipment fees payable to the AGCO to a tax that was absorbed by 
the consumer. John Graham at Church-Key expressed “The tax change in 2010 is really a 
defining point in the industry, it was government telling us they wanted independent 
brewers around in the future.” Gary McMullen of Muskoka Brewery explained that “the 
decisions that [governments] made at our behest – because we were lobbying hard, 
obviously - [the tax changes] were fundamental to this industry getting to where it has 
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gotten to. For me it’s a great public policy success in terms of making positive change for an 
industry and the impact its had in communities small and large throughout Canada.” 
Most recently, the Provincial Budget in April 2015 laid out proposed frameworks 
specifically aimed at improving beer retailing in Ontario. The move was likely a political 
reaction to a media leak in December 2014 of a secret deal signed June 1st, 2000 between 
Brewers Retail Inc. and the LCBO, which laid out The Beer Store’s exclusive rights to sell 
beer in large package formats such as the twelve and twenty-four pack, prohibited the 
LCBO from selling major beer brands to bars and restaurants, gave TBS exclusive rights to 
sell in that market, and mandated the LCBO to inform TBS if any new store was to open in a 
new community (LCBO; BRI, 2000).  
From spring of 2014, polls showed that 87% of consumers were not aware of The 
Beer Store’s ownership structure, and once informed, 68% disapproved and hoped to see 
change (Harrison, 2014). Investigation into this sweetheart deal for TBS, along with the 
rapidly growing craft beer market led, in 2015, to beer retailing being a particularly hot 
policy topic for the Liberal Government. John Graham at Church-Key felt that the highly 
publicized and rapidly implemented policy changes were to cover other controversial 
moves on the part of the Ontario Government, such as the sale of Hydro One. 
An outline of the major proposals under the new policies can be found in the report 
Striking the Right Balance: Modernizing Beer Retailing and Distribution in Ontario dated 
April 16, 2015. The major new changes are detailed in the new Master Framework 
Agreement between Brewers Retail Inc., Labatt Brewing Company Limited, Molson Canada, 
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Sleeman Breweries Ltd., and the Crown, signed September 22 2015. The core issues being 
addressed with the initial report were: 
“  – how to materially enhance customer convenience, choice and shopping 
experience, while continuing to ensure that Ontarians can buy their beer at prices 
below the Canadian average; and 
- How best to establish a level playing field for all producers selling beer in Ontario” 
The major components of these new policies affecting craft brewers are as follows:  
o Opening ownership of The Beer Store to all brewers with facilities on Ontario; 
allowing four independent (brewery owner) directors on the board with 
effective veto rights on brewer fairness and “other important issues”  
o Introduction of the Beer Ombudsman to promote accountability in TBS 
operations 
o The introduction of “New Private Retail Outlets” (grocery stores) as a sales 
channel, which took effect in December 2015 
o Minimum 20% in TBS and grocery stores, as well as costs of retailing through 
the TBS declining by a promised 5% to 10% 
o Pooled deliveries by small scale brewers to retail points of sale and licensees, 
added option of utilizing third party carriers and warehousing 
o The allowance for brewers to have a second on-site retail store if they have two 
brewing locations 
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o The June 2000 agreement entitled Serving Ontario Beer Consumers — 
Framework for Improved Co-operation and Planning Between the LCBO and BRI 
was dismantled 
(Master Framework Agreement, 2015) 
10.1 Policy at Work 
An interesting note in light of the introduction of these new policies is that brewers 
interviewed for this paper were unsure of the origins of the regulation regarding co-
delivering beer with other craft brewers or utilizing a third-party system. Most were 
relatively sure it was illegal (though unable to identify what specific part of the legislation 
actually prohibited this type of activity), and have been functioning under the impression 
that their actions might be against the rules.  
 
Pooled delivery for small brewers 
In order to help small brewers manage costs and grow their businesses, the New Beer 
Framework will permit them to jointly deliver their products to the LCBO and to licenced 
establishments. Use of third party carriers and warehousing will also be allowed under 
the authority of the LCBO. This initiative will also benefit the licensees and retail 
channels themselves, as it will reduce the number of deliveries they each have to 
accept. (from https://www.ontario.ca/page/modernizing-beer-retailing-and-
distribution) 
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At Block Three, owners felt that it was unfair that TBS had access to its own network 
of distribution services while craft brewers needed to use only their own trucks and staff. 
At Church-Key Brewing, John Graham noted that pooling deliveries “was illegal… from the 
prohibition repeal era when TBS was granted exclusive rights to it.” Interestingly, an actual 
piece of legislation that limits delivery and distribution rights to point of sale locations to 
The Beer Store and the LCBO does not exist. The rule was selectively enforced and third-
party companies that have performed this service would have had to become bonded 
through the AGCO, meaning exceptions were made to this policy. Beau’s All Natural, for 
example has been using RG Transfer, a third-party delivery and warehousing company, for 
a number of years.29  
In fact, the policy that prevented pooled and third-party deliveries previously is 
quite difficult to find (Appendix III).30 The policy says that before October 2015, small 
brewers could only use their own delivery fleet or TBS delivery and warehousing services. 
The website www.doingbusinesswiththeLCBO.com which brewery owners and staff are 
directed to as a resource for these policies, did not outright list the policy. The actual piece 
of legislation that exists in the Liquor Control Act 1990, which grants the LCBO control over 
the sale, transport and delivery of liquor, Section 3.1 b and c reads: 
                                                          
29 I tried to contact the owner of RG Transfer for this paper to ask him how he was granted exception, but he was 
unavailable. I was given this contact through John Graham, who is friends with the Beauchesne’s since the industry 
is very tight knit. According to Graham, the Beauchesne’s, Graham, and many other craft brewers in the region 
widely understood this practice was probably illegal.  There are also a number of casual stories about small 
brewers not interviewed for this story pooling deliveries to farther reaches of the Province such as the Windsor 
area. 
30 I learned this after contacting the Ontario Ministry of Finance, who then worked with their contacts at the LCBO 
to locate the original policy which took two weeks and was a photocopy of a document from the 1990s. It can be 
found in the appendix. 
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“Power and purposes of Board 
3. (1) The purposes of the Board are, and it has power, 
(a) to buy, import and have in its possession for sale, and to sell, liquor and other 
products containing alcohol and non-alcoholic beverages; 
(b) to control the sale, transportation and delivery of liquor; 
(c) to make provision for the maintenance of warehouses for liquor and to 
control the keeping in and delivery from any such warehouses; 
Liquor Control Act, R.S.O. 1990 c. L. 18. < 
https://www.ontario.ca/laws/statute/90l18#BK5> 
 
The Ontario budget released in April 2015 outlines that “small brewers will gain the 
ability to more efficiently deliver their products directly to retail points of sale and 
licensees by pooling their products with the option of using third-party carriers and 
warehousing.” “… consistent with current policies concerning deliveries to existing retail 
points of sale (but without limiting the Province’s ability to allow other distribution to 
these new retail outlets), Ontario brewers licensed by the Regulator will be permitted to 
distribute beer directly to these new retail outlets either individually or collectively 
through TBS or as may be otherwise permitted.” Some brewers thought that this was a 
policy of the AGCO, others, as stated above, were under the impression that this was a 
prohibition era exclusivity deal for TBS. It was simply an LCBO policy that was not listed 
anywhere accessible. That new legislation would offer pooled deliveries to small brewers 
as though it were never practiced before speaks to the murky political regulatory 
environment small brewers have historically functioned under and the knowledge gap that 
exists between brewers and the laws that govern them. 
Similarly, brewer’s on-site retail locations have been legally able to open and sell at 
9am since April 2015, and most brewers are unaware of this as that new regulation under 
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the AGCO was passed quietly with very little outreach (Interview, John Graham, December 
15, 2015).  
Beau’s has been something of a pioneer in civil disobedience of provincial brewery 
policies. In 2011 the company created the BYO Beau’s program, a home delivery service of 
Beau’s beer, administered by Beau’s to those in the Ottawa area. The delivery service was 
originally halted in December 2011 for contravening the Liquor Licence Act that delivery 
services must purchase directly from the LCBO or The Beer Store. Beau’s claimed ignorance 
to the policy and the Province of Ontario granted exemption from this rule relatively 
quickly. The company utilized an Ottawa area social enterprise to hire homeless persons as 
drivers for the initiative, and this charitable component likely made it difficult for the 
Province to shut it down. Following this move, the AGCO issued a bulletin announcing the 
change in these policies (AGCO, Info Bulletin no. 9028, 2011).  
 
10.2 New Retail Channels & the Future of TBS 
An interesting discussion in light of the new grocery store sales channel is what 
implications new policies have on the future of The Beer Store. With the knowledge that 
the Liberal Government had previously entered into a “secret” deal with TBS, it is difficult 
to imagine the Province fully removing authority from the three major foreign-owned 
corporations. With the major retail corporate interests backing them, small brewer’s 
numbers did not add up to be as powerful of a lobby group. Loblaw Companies Ltd. wanted 
a locally-based voice to rival those of Molson-Coors, Labatt and Sleeman at the bargaining 
table. It will be interesting to assess policy decisions that seem to give preference to one 
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interest over the other, i.e. large grocery retailers versus the three major owners of TBS, as 
it may reveal where the Province is placing priority, that is whether the Province sees 
wealth generation opportunities from within the Province or from foreign-owned interests. 
The recent announcement that Ontario craft ciders and wines would be available at grocery 
retail (Ontario News Release, February 18, 2016) seems to suggest the former. Loblaw 
Companies Ltd. has already made public a statement regarding its intention to stock more 
Ontario craft options than the necessary 20% of shelf space31, and appears to be the major 
grocery retailer opting for this market. Similarly, these “new retail channels shall be limited 
to 450 new retail outlets” (Master Framework Agreement, 6.5 (b)), a number that is 
curiously close to the 447 TBS retail outlets (The Beer Store, 2015). There is some 
speculation32 that the Province has intentions to effectively “replace” TBS by working with 
Ontario-owned grocery retailers. However, it is unlikely that TBS will ever truly go 
obsolete: its distribution network and consumer recycling resources are much too 
developed to dispose of. It is likely that TBS will maintain its position as sole retailer of high 
volume packaged beer such as twenty-four packs of commodity lagers – which is a place in 
the market that it does not seem any craft brewers are seeking to obtain – while grocery 
stores will stock smaller package formats.  
 
  
                                                          
31 In a press release issued December 15th, the first day of grocery store sales for beer. As well, the ribbon cutting 
ceremony with the Premier occurred at a Toronto area Loblaws store, and Loblaw Companies Ltd. stores have 
been the first with beer sections fully stocked. 
32 Among some members of the craft beer industry, casual knowledge. 
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11.0 Conclusions & Future Directions 
The experiences of four Ontario craft brewers functioning under the current frameworks 
reveal a number of key themes.  First, barriers to market entry for small brewing 
entrepreneurs are lower than ever, with available sales channels expanding, tiered tax 
rates, ease of access to traditional start-up capital, and a growing market of customers with 
a developed taste for different beer styles. This research has revealed, unsurprisingly, that 
entrepreneurs with a well laid-out and disciplined business plan are likely to succeed in 
this industry.  
Secondly, a major motivating factor and a key to success has been the passion and 
work ethic of small brewery owners. Without the early pioneer’s efforts, extra-curricular 
government lobbying, and organized formation of the Ontario Craft Brewers Association, 
the industry would likely not be where it is today. 
Third, the discussion of ownership, authenticity and responsible growth is a 
particularly topical one among craft brewers. Each brewery interviewed noted the “fake 
craft” brands owned by macro brewers are a major challenge. They also seek to keep the 
craft beer industry as convivial, genuine and cooperative as it currently is, which are traits 
they feel are lost on many business sectors. Further, each brewer independently 
commented on their wish to grow responsibly; remain somewhat niche, but be widely 
respected. This is consistent with resource partitioning theory (Swaminathan, 2000), 
where the market has one or two major players supplying the market with a general 
product and a larger number of smaller players offering differentiated niche products that 
cannot be provided by the large companies.  
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The conscious desire to avoid growing too big is in line with many principles of the 
Green Economy and low-growth economics (Victor, 2008; Jackson, 2009). Many brewers 
expressed sentiments of feeling overshadowed by their competitor macro brewers and are 
highly critical of those brewers’ foreign ownership and of companies growing so large. 
They strongly believe in local economic development and see themselves as leaders in their 
communities.  
Fourth, small Ontario brewers have commonly struggled with the retail sales 
channels available to them, whether this has been due to bureaucratic inefficiencies on the 
part of Crown Corporations, or cost barriers and the ownership structure associated with 
TBS.  
Fifth, navigating Provincial policies for Ontario craft brewers has historically been 
difficult, riddled with red tape and favouring the macro brewers. There is a particular sense 
among the craft beer industry that Ontario alcoholic beverage retailing policies are 
working against them, even when major strides are made to rectify some of the most 
pressing issues. Many craft brewers hold a distrust of government motives and, more than 
that, hold a sentiment that policies are written for larger companies with economies of 
scale and largely neglect to address SMEs. Many policies began to change in 2015, but the 
effect of them, as well as the business practices and relationships they have the potential to 
influence, remains to be seen. 
Sixth, the availability of alternative marketing techniques and information sharing 
has been a great boon to these brewers, confirming the findings of Clemons et al. (2006). By 
foregoing traditional marketing costs and instead taking advantage of inexpensive social 
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media and word-of-mouth strategies, brewers have been able to carve out their niches and 
create brand awareness quite effectively.  
Seventh, with regards to sustainable business practices in the sector, these four 
SMEs reported that in many cases, sustainable business practices were synonymous with 
savings, including reducing water use, capturing excess heat from refrigeration and 
reducing waste. Taking a mindful approach to sustainability, considering each angle and 
doing as much as possible was part of each brewery’s strategy.  The businesses studied 
here confirmed that brewery SMEs can successfully utilize sustainability in their business 
strategies and practices as well as remain flexible. Of the breweries I interviewed, two 
brewery owners had a deep and profound understanding of sustainability and brought that 
to their business practices; the other two held the best of intentions, though sustainability 
was seen as either a bonus or an afterthought. 
Finally, the industry is unique in its camaraderie and sense of community. That 
Ontario craft brewers see each other not as competition but as colleagues and often friends 
is some evidence that the diversity of the craft brewing network is working. The locally-
focused sales and marketing strategies of these breweries seems to suggest that there is 
enough market competition that brewers remain on a level playing field and on good terms 
with each other.  
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11.1 Future Directions 
Given all of this information, the major questions to the future of the industry as I 
understand them are: 
- What more can the Ontario Government do to cultivate diversity and maintain the 
strength of the brewery SME network in the economy?  
- How best can the “level playing field” be improved and then maintained?  
- What can be done to protect the concept of “craft” and ensure the “market correction” 
of craft products is maintained? Can we avoid market consolidation in the wake of craft 
brewery acquisitions by macro brewers?  
First, the Ontario Government could provide legal definition to “craft brewing.” At 
present, the Liquor Control Act defines a “small” brewer as “production did not exceed 
400,000 hectolitres of beer” in the past year (Liquor Control Act, R.S.O. 1990). The 
definition of craft as provided by the Ontario Craft Brewers Association is loose enough 
that it allows for growth up to that size, which is quite significant, but accounts for the basic 
need for “traditional” ingredients as well as independent ownership.  The Liquor Control 
Act could be revised to include more specific industry concepts to protect the definition of 
craft and encourage entrepreneurship. 
Second, at present, there are no legal requirements for manufacturers of alcoholic 
beverages to list ingredients or nutritional information on their labels. As a result, many 
craft brewers have taken advantage of this omission in the legal system to proudly display 
their short, traditional ingredients lists. In making ingredients labelling a legal requirement 
for all brewers, I believe consumers would be more inclined to purchase true craft beers as 
112 
 
they contain no adjuncts (i.e. rice, corn), while their fake craft competitors would be forced 
to list their adjuncts.   
Ontario is at a pivotal moment regarding The Beer Store and other retail sales 
channels. As stated in the analysis section, there is speculation that grocery stores may be 
slated to, in effect, replace TBS as the major retail sales channel. Moving in this direction 
appears to be responsible on the part of the Province, as it takes this piece of the market 
away from foreign-owned breweries and places that chunk of the market in the hands of 
large grocery retailers – some locally-owned, and some, like Loblaw Companies Ltd. are 
foreign-owned. Either way, more high-profile stakeholders in the sale of beer allows for a 
more diverse playing field than previously existed. If this is the case, The Beer Store could 
theoretically continue to be the major retailer of high volume packaged beer and discount 
brands, which may be an ideal place in the market for TBS and its extensive distribution 
network. While the relationships between small-scale brewers and large grocery retailers 
may cause friction as seen with the LCBO, there can easily be store-based systems in place 
to make those relationships easier, much like the Beer Ambassadors at the individual LCBO 
stores.  
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Hawkin, Phillip. Quality Assurance Manager, Beau’s All Natural Brewing Co. On site; 
November 11, 2015. 
 
McCaulay, Jeff. Purchasing Manager, Beau’s All Natural Brewing Co. Telephone 
correspondence; December 9, 2015. 
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Appendix I: Interview Guide 
For owners, presidents, CEOs 
Start up: 
 
• Can you tell me a bit about how you started this company? 
• What were your biggest start-up challenges?  
• Where did your start-up capital come from?  
• What were your biggest assets? How did you acquire them?  
• How did you scale your business? What were your investment priorities? 
 
Current: 
 
• What are your three biggest challenges currently?  
• What is your greatest operational expense?  
• What do you wish you had more resources to do?  
• To what do you primarily attribute to your brewery’s success? 
• What are the factors you feel draw people to your product?  
 
Food Industry etc.: 
 
• How do you integrate into your local community?  
• Do you source your ingredients locally?  
• What is your stance on the local food movement?  
• How do you feel the local buying local trend has affected your business? 
• Has the Ontario craft beer industry’s growth had any effects, good or bad, on your 
business?  
• What do you attribute the current growth of the industry to? 
• What do you see as the industry’s greatest weaknesses?  
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• How do you feel about standardization in terms of waste reduction? i.e. bottling 
standardization for more recycling, etc? 
• How do you integrate sustainability into your business practices? What are the 
motivations?  
 
Staff Questions 
 How long have you worked for Beau’s?  
 What is your role there? Purchasing Manager 
 How did you come to work for the company?  
 What were you doing before?  
 Did you relocate to work for Beau’s? If so, from where? 
 Do you have specific training or educational background for the role you perform at 
Beau’s?  
 Describe what your role entails and your day-to-day at work: 
 Do you feel your role is impactful? (this can mean for the company, or even for the 
world at large if you want to think on a macro scale) 
 Do you feel there is anything unique to your position specific to Beau’s? (i.e. how 
does it look different or similar to being purchasing manager at any other 
company?) 
 Do you feel you are compensated adequately and/or within an industry norm for 
your role? 
 Do you see your long-term career in the craft beer industry (or at Beau’s 
specifically)?  
 How would you describe Beau’s All Natural Brewing Co. as an employer?  
 Do you note anything specific about working in craft beer vs. other industries? Are 
there any perks/trade offs? 
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Appendix II: Labbatt Connections Brief on fake craft marketing 
 
123 
 
Appendix III: Original LCBO policy regarding pooled deliveries for 
small brewers. 
 
